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Violent Video Games and the Rights of
Children and Parents: A Critique of Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association
by MARTIN GUGGENHEIM*
I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that
[children have First Amendment rights] except when
they do not. . . .
Introduction
One important kind of struggle within the First Amendment
involves the effort to restrict particular art forms from being
produced, distributed, or enjoyed because state officials consider their
content unacceptable. For most of American history, states were free
to censor entertainment that legislatures deemed inappropriate for
civil society. Modern students of American culture might not
appreciate just how closely censors monitored art because today's
Supreme Court is an aggressive defender of freedom of expression.
The Court insists that the marketplace be kept open both to further
the political values of American democracy and to advance the
intrinsic value of individual liberty to enjoy literature, film, and all
other expressive media. Today, Americans enjoy the freedom to read
books and magazines, and to be entertained at the movies and by
television, notwithstanding that a majority of members of society
might never wish to be exposed to this protected material.
As recently as the 1930s, however, federal courts declared that
radio content was unprotected by the First Amendment because it
* Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of
Law. I am grateful to the Florence D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at
New York University School of Law for financial support and to Norman Dorsen who
helpfully read an earlier draft. A version of this article was presented at the Association
of American Law Schools Annual Meeting in New York on January 3, 2014, at a panel
sponsored by the section on Children and the Law.
1. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
[707]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
was merely entertainment.2 Not until 1943 did the Supreme Court
hold for the first time that radio is a protected medium, even if to a
lesser degree than the more familiar print media.' It took until 1952
for the Court to declare that the content of motion pictures was
protected by the First Amendment-ultimately indistinguishable for
constitutional purposes from literature. And it was as late as 1957
that the Supreme Court set into motion the demise of state censors'
ban on "obscene" books.' This meant that by the 1960s, for the first
time in American history, books and other forms of entertainment
that had long been treated by the government as officially banned
could be openly enjoyed throughout the country. In other words,
American society officially permitted what could reasonably be
characterized as "adult entertainment."
This remarkable transformation to the most robust free culture
of expression in the world created some second-generation issues,
most of which have been resolved by the Supreme Court. Thus, for
example, individuals who may be said to suffer some harm from
another's exercise of free speech have pressed their claims to have
their separate interests accommodated. This includes individuals who
do not want their mailboxes filled with unsolicited salacious
materials, 6 who do not want to see t-shirts emblazoned with
provocative language,' and who become the butt of unwelcomed
jokes.
The Supreme Court has largely resolved these competing claims
by tolerating free speech and requiring those who prefer otherwise to
learn to accept the rules of American society. In the Court's words:
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our
pluralistic society, constantly proliferating new and
ingenious forms of expression, "we are inescapably
captive audiences for many purposes." Much that we
encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and
2. See Trinity Methodist Church v. Fed. Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850, 851, 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1932).
3. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
4. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (overruling
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). See generally
EDWARD DEGRAZIA & ROGER NEWMAN, BANNED FILMS (1982).
5. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
7. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
8. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution
does not permit government to decide which types of
otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive
to require protection for the unwilling listener or
viewer. Rather... the burden normally falls upon the
viewer to "avoid further bombardment of [his]
sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."'
However, one of the particularly vexing second-generation
questions involves children. How much of what is meant as fair game
for adults to enjoy should also be available to children? This Article
focuses on this important question as it examines the 2011 Supreme
Court decision in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,1o
which held that California's effort to restrict children's access to
violent video games violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, this
Article argues that the Brown law should have been more tolerant of
government efforts to restrict children's access to materials adults
have the right to enjoy, especially when the restrictions were enacted
to assist parents in raising their children.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets out four different
categories of cases involving some form of censorship by government
officials focused on efforts to treat children differently from adults or
to keep material from reaching children, as background for analyzing
the Brown decision. Part II situates the rights of children and the
corollary principles of parental rights into the broader picture of the
issues raised in Brown. Part III describes and analyzes the Brown
decision. Part IV offers a critique of the majority's reasoning in
Brown. This Article concludes in Part V with a proposal to regulate
children's access to violent materials that is designed to guard against
government overreaching and to protect parental rights.
9. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (citations omitted).
See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (stating that "[i]n the realm of
religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the
tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification
of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement.
But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.").
10. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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I. Regulating Speech Meant for Adults in an Open Society
Efforts to restrict books, film, and other forms of entertainment
have taken several forms. The broadest, and best known, is the
straightforward attempt to ban entirely the dissemination of
particular material on the ground that the targeted materials were
unfit for anyone. But, other efforts to restrict material arguably
protected by the First Amendment have also been attempted in which
an important focus of concern is the impact on children. One such
effort is to ban certain material on the ground that banning it is the
only way to ensure it will not get into the hands of children. This is a
very different basis for the banning. Though both result in material
being unavailable to anyone, what distinguishes them is their purpose.
We will designate the first kind of case as "Category A" and the
second kind "Category B." Category B cases seek to prevent adult
access to material, but only to ensure that they do not make their way
to children.
There are two other kinds of censorship efforts in which
children's interests are prominently involved. In one, the effort seeks
to restrict the time, place, or manner in which adults may have access
to the materials in order to reduce the risk that children will also be
able to gain access. We will call these "Category C" cases. Finally,
"Category D" cases merely seek to restrict children's access to
materials with no attempt to interfere with an adult's right to access
the materials. What follows is a brief discussion of each category as a
prelude to an examination of the 2011 Brown decision.
A. Category A Cases
In 1952, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson," a film distributor
challenged a New York statute which required the distributor to
secure a license from the New York State Education Department
before showing a film. After the distributor was originally given the
license, audiences complained to the Board of Regents that the film
was "sacrilegious"-a permissible ground to ban a film under the
statute.1 The Board reviewed the film a second time, concluded that
it was sacrilegious, and rescinded the distributor's license to exhibit
the picture.
The Supreme Court rejected New York's position that motion
pictures should remain outside of the First Amendment "because
11. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 122 (1947).
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their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business
conducted for private profit."13 It explained that even though "books,
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit," they
have long received First Amendment protection.14 Ultimately, the
Court was unable to grasp why films should not receive the same
protection. Even though films are usually produced for
entertainment, "[t]he line between the informing and the
entertaining," the Court explained, "is too elusive for the protection
of that basic right (a free press). Everyone is familiar with instances
of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine."" Having concluded that the First
Amendment protects films, the Court had little difficulty striking the
statute as an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech and a free
press. This case is important in the development of free speech in the
United States because it established the rule that films are protected
means of expression within the First Amendment, which put to rest a
fifty-year experiment of censorship of motion pictures by the state or
federal government."
Beginning in the 1950s and concluding in the early 1970s, the
Court struggled to develop a test for obscenity that achieves the
purpose of restricting government censorship of sexually explicit
materials that is properly categorized as "obscene," but also protects
sexually explicit material that has social value. In Roth v. United
States, the Court ruled that the First Amendment forbids only
sexually explicit material that is "utterly without redeeming social
importance.",8 Although Roth upheld a conviction under a federal
statute punishing the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or
filthy..." materials, Justice William Brennan's plurality opinion was
widely read as intending to open the marketplace for material that
had too easily been subject to suppression. "All ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion-" Justice Brennan explained, "have the full protection of
13. Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
16. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
17. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
18. Id. at 484.
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the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.""
It was not until 1973 that the Court was able to fashion a test for
defining obscenity that commanded a majority of Justices. That test,
announced in Miller v. California,20 rejected the requirement that a
prosecutor must prove that the material is "utterly without redeeming
social value" in order to sustain a conviction for obscenity.21 In its
place, a slightly easier test was fashioned:
(a) whether "the average person, applying
contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.22
In 1982, in New York v. Ferber,3 the Court addressed another
law enacted to forbid entirely certain kinds of materials. Ferber
upheld a New York statute that made it a crime to distribute or
possess child pornography. 24 At the time the case was decided, it was
unclear whether Ferber added a new category of speech that is
outside of the First Amendment because the content was inherently
underserving of protection or, as turned out to be the case, because
the production of the material-itself a separate crime-is
inextricably connected to its distribution and possession. The Ferber
Court explained that the production of child pornography is itself
child "abuse," "molestation," or "exploitation." 25  Reasoning that
child pornography could not be produced without committing a
19. Id. An important part of the Roth test was "[W]hether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest .. .. " Id. at 489.
20. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21. Id. at 24-25.
22. Id. at 24.
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
24. Id. at 765-66.
25. See, e.g., id. at 749 ("In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the
production of pornography has become a serious national problem"); id. at 758 n.9
("Sexual molestation by adults is often involved in the production of child sexual
performances.").
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crime, the Court upheld the New York law as a reasonable means to
prevent the crime of misusing "children who are made to engage in
sexual conduct for commercial purposes." 26
Since the New York law furthered a compelling interest in
combating the crime of child sexual abuse, and "the distribution
network for child pornography must be closed if the production of
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be
effectively controlled,"27 the Court held that New York was justified:
[Iln believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
halt the exploitation of children by pursuing only those
who produce the photographs and movies.... The
most expeditious if not the only practical method of
law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this
material by imposing severe criminal penalties on
persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting
the product.
Ferber induced Congress in 1996 to enact the federal Child
Pornography Protection Act, which was reviewed by the Supreme
Court in 2002 in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition."o The federal law
made it a crime to possess or distribute "any visual depiction ...
[that] is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct," even if it contained only youthful looking adult actors or
virtual images of children generated by a computer." This time, the
Court had little difficulty striking the law as unconstitutional,
explaining that the child-protection rationale from Ferber was missing
in the federal law because the prohibited depictions did not
necessarily involve children at all. Ferber, the Court explained, does
not apply to materials produced without children.
26. Id. at 753 (citing New York v. Ferber, 454 U.S. 1052 (1981) (granting State's
petition for certiorari)).
27. Id. at 759.
28. Id. at 759-60. See also id. at 761 ("The advertising and selling of child
pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the
production of such materials . . . .").
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2014).
30. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
31. Id. at 241 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)).
32. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 249-51, 254.
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Most recently, in 2010, in United States v. Stevens," the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute which established a
criminal penalty "for anyone who knowingly 'creates, sells, or
possesses a depiction of animal cruelty' if done 'for commercial gain'
in interstate or foreign commerce."' "Animal cruelty" was defined as
involving "a living animal [that] is intentionally maimed, mutilated,
tortured, wounded, or killed."35 The law contained an "exceptions
clause," exempting from prohibition "any depiction that has serious
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or
artistic value." 6
The federal government asked the Court to add depictions of
animal cruelty that lacked artistic value to the short list of subjects
that do not deserve First Amendment protection. The Court rejected
the request, explaining that "[t]he First Amendment's guarantee of
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive
an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits."3  The
Amendment, the Court explained, "reflects a judgment by the
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs.""
Stevens rejected "a freewheeling authority to declare new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment." 39
The case also provided the Court with a recent opportunity to
summarize the very limited areas that do not receive First
33. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
34. Id. at 1582 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 48(a)).
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 1583 (citing 18 U.S C. § 48(b)).
37. Id. at 1585.
38. Id. at 1585.
39. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
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Amendment protection:" obscenity,4 1 defamation, 42  fraud,43
incitement," and speech integral to criminal conduct.45
B. Category B Cases
In this category, state officials seek to ban everyone's access to
material but only because the material is inappropriate for children.
This first important case in this category is the 1948 case, Winters v.
New York." In Winters, the Court held that a New York law which
forbid the publishing or distribution of any printed material "devoted
to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police
reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds
of bloodshed, lust or crime," 47 violated the First Amendment, despite
the state's claim that the law was "aimed at the protection of minors
from the distribution of publications devoted principally to criminal
news and stories of bloodshed, lust or crime.""
Nine years later, the Court reviewed a bookseller's conviction of
violating a Michigan statute that banned the production and
distribution of any book to anyone, adult or minor, that "tend[ed] to
incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth." 49 The Michigan
legislature did not regard the books as posing a risk of corrupting
adults, but the means it took to avoid corrupting minors was to ban
the books from everyone. In Butler v. Michigan,so Justice Felix
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, had little difficulty concluding the
law was unconstitutional, explaining that the effect of the law "is to
40. Id. at 1584 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957), for obscenity;
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1952), for defamation; Va. Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), for fraud; Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam), for incitement; and Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949), for speech integral to criminal conduct. The
Court also noted that it had summarized these areas on many other occasions). Id.
(quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing United States v. Playboy
Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000))).
41. Roth, 354 U.S. at 483.
42. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254-55.
43. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
44. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49.
45. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.
46. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
47. N.Y. PENAL LAW §1141(2) (1946).
48. Winters, 333 U.S. at 511.
49. MICH. PEN. CODE § 343 (1956).
50. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for
children."" In even more colorful language, he condemned the effort
as an example of "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."5 2
The next effort to ban books on the ground they should not be
allowed in the hands of children reached the Court in 1963 when the
Court decided Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan." In that case, the
Court reviewed the efforts of a state-created "Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth," that took it upon itself
to send letters to book distributers alerting them that certain books
"had been declared by a majority of its members to be objectionable
for sale, distribution or display to youths under 18 years."" These
books included Peyton Place and The Bramble Bush." Rather than
risk trouble by allowing the books to end up in children's hands, upon
receiving the letter the bookseller had the books removed from
distribution and then challenged the legality of the Commission's
efforts in court. In a short opinion, the Court condemned the
Commission's work explaining that "although the Commission's
supposed concern is limited to youthful readers, the 'cooperation' it
seeks from distributors invariably entails the complete suppression of
the listed publications; adult readers are equally deprived of the
opportunity to purchase the publications in the State.""
More recently, in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC," the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") sought to protect
minors from indecent telephone messages by banning all indecent
messages. The concern was not with what adults themselves could
do, only with the spillover impact on minors who, in the nature of
things, might end up unintended recipients of adult conversations.
Following Butler's lead, the Court condemned the regulations as
51. Id. at 383.
52. Id. The Court rejected the State's claim that it was lawful to impose a blanket
ban on public dissemination of literature that has "a potentially deleterious influence upon
youth," explaining that the law "arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual,
now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has
attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free
society." Id. at 384.
53. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,71 (1963).
54. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 61.
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id. at 71.
57. Sable Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-31 (1989).
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having "the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone
conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear.""
Congress' efforts to limit speech on the Internet in order to
protect children have also been found wanting by the Court. In 1996,
Congress enacted a statute" that made it a crime to use indecent
language in circumstances where children would likely hear it. In
1997, in Reno v. ACLU, stressing that this law infringed on adults'
right to access protected material, the Court struck down the law as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.6o In the Court's words, the
law:
[L]acks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of
speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the [statute] effectively suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one
another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable
if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the
statute was enacted to serve.
Legislatures have not only made efforts to suppress books, film
and entertainment otherwise fit for adults in order to protect
children-they have also attempted to limit commercial speech that
can be harmful to children. They have fared little better in these
efforts. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,62 for example, the Court
struck down a law, enacted to protect children, that restricted the
advertising of tobacco, explaining that "[i]t is difficult to see any
stopping point to a rule that would allow a State to prohibit all speech
in favor of an activity in which it is illegal for minors to engage." 3
58. Id. at 131. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983)
(invalidating restrictions on contraceptive advertisements because "[t]he level of discourse
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox").
59. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
60. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
61. Id. at 874.
62. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 582 (2001).
63. Id. at 579-80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It is difficult to see any stopping point to
a rule that would allow a State to prohibit all speech in favor of an activity in which it is
illegal for minors to engage. Presumably, the State could ban car advertisements in an
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Justice Thomas perhaps best summarized the law in Category B cases
in his concurring opinion in that case. In his words, "The theory that
public debate should be limited in order to protect impressionable
children has a long historical pedigree .... But the theory has met
with a less enthusiastic reception in this Court than it did in the
Athenian assembly.""
C. Category C Cases
In this category, government efforts focus on restricting the
means through which adults may access material deemed
inappropriate for children, without trying to forbid adult access.
Many of the cases in this category involve entertainment that enters
homes through modern media, including radio, television and cable.
The cable cases involved an effort to restrict sexually explicit
programs from being sent to homes where children live because of
the danger that children would be able to access them.
It should be unsurprising that there are many cases in this
category. The upshot of Supreme Court decisions is that the United
States enjoys the broadest marketplace of materials protected by the
Constitution of any country in the world. Not only is the Court
committed to protecting "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests,"" but no longer is the censor permitted to focus
only on the raciest of material. Instead, the publication must be
viewed in the larger context. As a result, publishers and Hollywood
producers were broadly liberated in the past generation to produce
effort to enforce its restrictions on underage driving. It could regulate advertisements
urging people to vote, because children are not permitted to vote. And, although the
Solicitor General resisted this implication of her theory... the State could prohibit
advertisements for adult businesses, which children are forbidden to patronize.").
64. Id. at 580-81 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983).
65. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004);
United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU,
535 U.S. 564 (2002); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). See generally Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP.
Cr. REv. 141 (1997).
66. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957).
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material, framed within a larger scope of literary value, which has
transformed American entertainment.
But as the Court opened the marketplace for art, there has been
an important competing concern. Chief Justice Warren Burger
expressed it well in the context of sexually explicit material: "the
States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or
exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles."" Category C cases
represent the efforts of legislatures to limit the dissemination of
constitutionally protected materials to children by regulating when
and where adults may have access to them. Because even these
efforts interfere with adults' capacity to access material protected by
the First Amendment, they are, like Category B cases, subject to strict
scrutiny.' As a result, the restrictions are often found wanting
because they are overbroad: Better tailored laws designed to protect
minors would meet the government's goals without unduly interfering
with the rights of adults.6 9
An early, and well-known, case in this category is Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville,o in which the Court invalidated a city ordinance
that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from exhibiting films
containing nudity when the screen was visible from a public place."
Recognizing that the city sought to "protect[] minors from this type of
visual influence," the Court nonetheless explained that "only in
relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government
bar public dissemination of protected materials to them." Applying
67. Miller v. California, 415 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 567 (1969); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 317 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 360-62 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690
(1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
195 (1964); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 382-83 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464-65
(1952)); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
88-89 (1949); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944).
68. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
69. Id. at 660 (finding law burdened adult speech by requiring credit card or other
means of age verification); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826
(2000) (finding law burdened adult speech by forcing cable operators to time-channel
content).
70. Erznozni v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
71. Id. at 211-12.
72. Id. at 212-13.
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heightened scrutiny, the Court invalidated the ordinance because it
was not narrowly tailored to shield minors from obscenity." Ever
since, the Court has reviewed efforts to regulate adult access to
materials for the purpose of limiting children's access by applying
strict scrutiny. If, in the Court's view, there were less restrictive
means to shield children from "adult" material, the restrictions were
declared unconstitutional.74
Of the various efforts to limit what adults may see and hear in
order to aid parents in shielding their children from undesirable ideas,
images or language, Congress' efforts to regulate broadcast media
have been the most successful. Broadcast media is subject to greater
oversight than other forms of expression because "[a] licensed
broadcaster is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it
is burdened by enforceable public obligations.""
Perhaps the best known example is the 1978 case, FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, which provided the Court with the first
opportunity to address the constitutionality of federal statutory and
regulatory laws that prohibit the broadcasting of "any ... indecent ...
language,"77 which includes expletives referring to sexual or excretory
activity or organs, between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.78  In
Pacifica, the FCC fined a radio station for playing during daytime
hours George Carlin's classic "seven dirty words" comedic
monologue in which he talked about, often, and to great humor,
seven words that are forbidden in proper American settings. There
was nothing prurient about his monologue; it was an examination of
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997) (parental control tools can
provide a "reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from
accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate
for their children"); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000)
("the objective of shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the
protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative").
75. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981).
76. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
78. The statutory prohibition applicable to commercial radio and television stations
extends by its terms from 6 a.m. to midnight, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled in 1995 that it was unconstitutional to extend between the hours of 10:00
p.m. and midnight. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
79. The words, by the way, are shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and
tits.
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the meaning of the limits of "proper speech"-a brilliant discourse on
the subject, at least for an adult audience.
Pacifica argued that it had the right to broadcast the routine
because nothing in it appealed to the prurient interest. But the FCC
regulations forbid the broadcasting of "indecent" material and the
Court rejected Pacifica's claim, observing that "the normal definition
of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality."" The Court found both that the language
Carlin used was outside of accepted standards of morality and, most
importantly, because of the "uniquely pervasive presence" of radio,
combined with the fact that broadcast programming is "uniquely
accessible to children," it upheld the fine." The Court explained that
the "government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' . . . justified
the regulation of otherwise protected expression"8-treating those
households that did not want their homes invaded with language they
deemed inappropriate, either for themselves or their children, to be
equivalent to a captive audience."
The prohibition against "any ... indecent ... language"" being
broadcast into homes between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. 85 has
been recently challenged by arguing that it is "likely" that children
"hear this language far more often from other sources than they did
in the 1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent
speech."" The argument has failed. As the Supreme Court explained
as recently as 2009, it is rational for the FCC to conclude that isolated
utterances of prohibited language can be harmful to children.'
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, acknowledged that
there is no empirical evidence to demonstrate that children are
harmed when they hear banned words. Nonetheless, he wrote:
80. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740.
81. Id. at 748-49.
82. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968)).
83. Id. 748-49.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
85. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954. The statutory
prohibition applicable to commercial radio and television stations extends by its terms
from 6 a.m. to midnight, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
1995 that it was unconstitutional to extend between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
86. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2nd Cir. 2007).
87. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009).
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There are some propositions for which scant
empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful
effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of
them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled
study, in which some children are intentionally
exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all
other indecency), and others are shielded from all
indecency.
The upshot of the law today is that broadcast radio and television
are limited in what they may present during 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.-the
hours when children are most likely to be listening or watching.
These rules serve the twin goals of accommodating parents who wish
to restrict their children's access to material that refrains from using
"dirty words," and the state's independent interest in protecting
children."
Although the Court has permitted relatively broad restrictions
on when certain content protected by the First Amendment may be
broadcast into homes, it has been considerably less tolerant of federal
efforts to regulate cable and other media in which viewers pay for the
privilege of securing the signal to their televisions. In 2000, the Court
decided United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.," which
reviewed a law enacted by Congress that required cable television
operators who provide channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-
oriented programming." 91 The law called for cable operators to either
"fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels, 2 or to limit
their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing,
set by administrative regulation as the time between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m.' The purpose of the law was to shield children from hearing or
seeing images resulting from "signal bleed." 94 Most cable operators
chose to comply with the law by limiting the hours of the day certain
88. Id. at 519.
89. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (citing Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (the government's interest in the "well-being of its
youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the
regulation of otherwise protected expression).
90. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
91. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, Pub.L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 136, 47 U.S.C. §
561 (1994 ed., Supp. III).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
93. 47 C.F.R. § 76.227 (1999).
94. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 808 (2000).
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signals could be viewed, eliminating entirely the transmission of the
targeted programming between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Although the
law's purpose was legitimate, the Court found that its means were
not.95
These few cases are representative of the effort to accommodate
adults' right to have access to constitutionally protected material with
the state's independent interest in limiting material unsuitable to
children. The next category considers the problem from an entirely
different place.
D. Category D Cases
In this category, legislation makes no effort to interfere with
adult access to materials. Instead, all that is sought is to limit
children's access. Of the four categories identified in this Article, this
category contains by far the fewest number of cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Altogether, there are only three cases in this
category. Two of them were decided on the same day in 1968. The
third, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association," was decided in
2011 and will be discussed in Part IV.
By far the most important, and best known, case in this category
is the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Ginsberg v. New York."
Because the precedential importance of Ginsberg is the central focus
of this Article, it deserves to be examined carefully. Ginsberg
addressed the constitutionality of a New York statute that made it
illegal to sell sexually explicit books and magazines to minors." In
Ginsberg, a candystore owner on Long Island was arrested and
convicted for selling what the Court referred to as a "girlie
magazine"" to a child under seventeen years old. The statute under
which he was convicted prohibited the sale to persons under
seventeen, depictions of nudity, sexual conduct, and sadomasochistic
abuse that "(i) pre-dominantly appea[l] to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and (ii) [are] patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect
95. Id. at 815. ("[T]argeted blocking enables the Government to support parental
authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing
listeners.... [T]argeted blocking is less restrictive than banning, and the Government
cannot ban speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its
compelling interests").
96. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
97. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
98. Id. at 631.
99. Id. at 632.
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to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) [are] utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors." "
Many might conclude that such a law is exceptionally vague and
overbroad, making it treacherous for magazine sellers because they
could never be certain, at least not until a jury told them so, whether a
particular magazine is "patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable
material for minors." After all, there are not that many conversations
about this in the first place. How would a storeowner know if a
particular Playboy Magazine would be regarded as unsuitable for a
sixteen year-old boy, for instance?
However vague the law may read, it is important to grasp that
the New York legislature did nothing more in enacting it than add the
words "of minors," or "for minors," to the precise test that the Court
had itself fashioned for censoring materials containing what the film
industry today would call "strong sexual content." The New York
statute was nothing more than the then-existing obscenity standard
formulated in Roth v. United States in 1957,11 modified in 1966 in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts," and applied to minors."
The storeowner in Ginsberg challenged the law as
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court held
that the law was constitutional. The Court explained that the statute
had been construed by New York's highest court to be "'virtually
identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement of the
elements of obscenity."'" Given that the Court really was being
asked to discard its own recently developed standard, unsurprisingly
it rejected both claims. In the Court's words, the test it developed, as
slightly modified by the New York legislature, "gives 'men in acting
adequate notice of what is prohibited' and does not offend the
requirements of due process." 0 s
But the Court's focus on vagueness and overbreadth filled a
mere four paragraphs in its opinion. The Court's main focus was New
York's introduction of a brand new concept in the field of obscenity:
100. Id. at 633 (citation omitted).
101. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
102. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
103. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968).
104. Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
105. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 492; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 520 (1948)).
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"variable obscenity"-material that is not obscene for adults, but
lawfully banned as to minors.'"
The Court heartily endorsed New York's concept, agreeing that
there is a category of sexually explicit material that adults, but not
children, ought to be entitled to enjoy.'" It is extremely important to
consider the historical context of this matter. Recall that prior to the
1950s, there was no need in American law to vary obscenity. Once
the Supreme Court opened the marketplace to previously banned
sexually explicit material, it is hardly surprising that this newly lawful
material started to be referred to as "adult material."
For this reason, Ginsberg is best understood in a historical
context. The decision, and its reasoning, was the corollary of the
mindset that found it a close choice to allow even adults to read Lady
Chatterley's Lover" or Fanny Hill,'"-two books that went from
being banned in the United States to protected material in the 1950s
and 1960s because, taken as a whole, they were of literary value.' If
it were a close call to permit a mature adult to read something edgy
for its time, it would be an obvious choice not to permit children
ready access to it.
This explains the mindset of the reluctant judge who was pushed
to open up the marketplace. Even more interestingly perhaps, it
made even more strategic sense to limit children's access to this
growing corpus of material for the progressive judge who hoped to
expand the marketplace and minimize censorship. The progressive
judge readily grasped that the more questionable the material, the
more difficult it would be to secure the necessary votes to approve its
availability in the marketplace. When lobbying the reluctant judge, it
helps considerably to be able to stress that this is for adults only.
Building on Justice Frankfurter's insight, reluctant judges are most
likely to reduce what is available to adults when they understand it
will necessarily also be available to children."'
Thus, it should not be too surprising that Justice Brennan, who
happened to be the author of both plurality opinions in Roth and
106. Id. at 635.
107. Id. at 641-43.
108. D. H. LAWRENCE, LADY CHAlTERLEY'S LOVER (1928).
109. JOHN CLELAND, MEMOIRS OF A WOMAN OF PLEASURE (FANNY HILL) (1748).
110. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (ruling that Fanny Hill is not
obscene). See also Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2nd Cir. 1960) (ruling
that Lady Chatterley's Lover was not obscene).
111. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 380-83 (1957).
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Memoirs, also authored the Court's opinion in Ginsberg. Limiting the
newly recognized right of adults to view risqu6 materials was an idea
advanced by Justice Brennan himself four years earlier in an opinion
announcing the Court's judgment in Jacobellis v. Ohio."' All of this
paved the way for New York to defend the statute in Ginsberg as
necessary to shield children from material that only recently entered
the marketplace but was unsuitable for minors.
New York defended the concept of variable obscenity in three
ways. The Court accepted all of them. First, New York successfully
argued that "the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' The Court
explained that "[t]he well-being of its children is of course a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . . .""4 Second,
the Court agreed with New York that "it was rational for the
legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such material might be
harmful.""' Finally, the Court agreed, for two reasons, that it was
proper for the legislature to restrict minors' access to these materials.
First, because parents':
[A]uthority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society, [t]he legislature could properly conclude that
parents and others, teachers for example, who have
this primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."'
112. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) ("We recognize the legitimate and
indeed exigent interest of States and localities throughout the Nation in preventing the
dissemination of material deemed harmful to children.... State and local authorities
might well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better served by laws
aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather
than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.").
113. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 631, 638 (1968) (citation omitted).
114. Id.at639.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Second, the Court concluded that the State's "independent interest in
the well-being of its youth""' allowed it to regulate harmful material
that might reach children.
The only other case in this category decided by the Supreme
Court before 2011 was announced the same day the Court decided
Ginsberg."' In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,"9 the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of a different effort to vary the content
of what adults and children may view. In that case, the Court struck
down as unconstitutionally vague a local ordinance that forbad films
from being shown to children under sixteen that were found "not
suitable for young persons" by a review board.'20 The board was
charged with the duty to review all films and to label films unsuitable
for minors when they described or portrayed "brutality, criminal
violence or depravity in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of
the Board, likely to incite or encourage crime or delinquency on the
part of young persons."l2 1 The board was also required to label a film
"unsuitable" if it:
Describ[ed] or portray[ed] nudity beyond the
customary limits of candor in the community, or sexual
promiscuity or extra-marital or abnormal sexual
relations in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of
the Board, likely to incite or encourage delinquency or
117. Id. at 640-41 ("[T]he State has an interest to protect the welfare of children and
to see that they are safeguarded from abuses which might prevent their growth into free
and independent well-developed men and citizens.").
118. There have been a number of decisions in state or lower federal court addressing
the legality of efforts to limit the distribution of books or film to minors. All were found
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Katzev v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360 (1959)
(magazine sales to minors under age eighteen); Police Commissioner v. Siegel Enterprises,
Inc., 162 A.2d 727 (Md. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960) (sale of certain
publications to those under eighteen); Paramount Film Distributing Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (special license for films deemed objectionable
for those under age twenty-one); People v. Bookcase, Inc., 201 N.E.2d 14, 15-16 (N.Y.
1964) (book sales to minors under age eighteen); Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F. Supp. 1328,
1334 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (E.D. Wis.
1970); Motion Picture Ass'n of America v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
119. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 681-82 (1968).
120. Id. at 691.
121. Id. at 681.
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sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to
appeal to their prurient interest.122
These tests deviated substantially from the then-accepted Roth-
Memoirs test established by the Court. In Ginsberg, New York asked
the Court to endorse a state law that was carefully drafted in light of
the standard established by the Court itself. The City of Dallas came
before the Court in a very different posture. It had to defend an
ordinance drawn beyond the contours of the Court's own test. As a
result, the Court declared the ordinance unenforceable as it found it
to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. But the Court did not
criticize the purpose of the ordinance, only its language. In rejecting
the ordinance as unduly overbroad, the Court explained:
It is essential that legislation aimed at protecting
children from allegedly harmful expression-no less
than legislation enacted with respect to adults-be
clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be
reasonably precise so that those who are governed by
the law and those that administer it will understand its
-123
meaning and application.
122. Chapter 46A of the 1960 Revised Code of Civil and Criminal Ordinances of the
City of Dallas (1)(f) (reproduced as Appendix in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 691 (1968). The ordinance also explained that
A film shall be considered "likely to incite or encourage" crime
delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in
the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability that it will
create the impression on young persons that such conduct is profitable,
desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly
accepted. A film shall be considered as appealing to "prurient
interest" of young persons, if in the judgment of the Board, its
calculated or dominant effect on young persons is substantially to
arouse sexual desire. In determining whether a film is "not suitable for
young persons," the Board shall consider the film as a whole, rather
than isolated portions, and shall determine whether its harmful effects
outweigh artistic or educational values such film may have for young
persons.
Id. at 681-82.
123. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) (citation omitted).
Justice Marshall stressed the costs to adults that are incurred even when laws restrict
material only to minors. First, he warned, if Dallas could enact such an ordinance, every
city in the country could too, impacting the decision of filmmakers and exhibitors who
might choose to produce and show
[N]othing but the innocuous... or only the totally inane. The vast
wasteland that some have described in reference to another medium
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H. Children's Rights, Parental Rights, and the First
Amendment
The preceding overview of First Amendment cases is essential to
analyzing the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Brown, which this
Article does in Part III. Before getting there, however, it is important
to discuss the role parents play in shaping children's values under the
Constitution and also, more broadly, the subject of children's rights,
about which virtually nothing has yet been said.
The cases discussed in Part I place overwhelming emphasis on
two interconnected concepts: the freedom of individuals to read and
hear ideas about which they have an interest, and the corollary
limiting principle of state officials' authority to restrict the
dissemination of ideas. Though these are corollary principles, they
need also to be examined independently. First, state officials lack the
power to limit what adults read for two separate reasons. In order to
ensure that the people remain positioned to form a new government
at every election, we forbid government from limiting ideas in the
marketplace. Free speech is our solution to avoid creeping toward
dictatorship.124
Second, wholly apart from this concern, we value free speech
intrinsically because it furthers the laudable goal of permitting
individuals to live the life they choose for themselves, to pursue their
own interests, and to get pleasure from that which pleases them. In
recent years, the word that has best captured this set of ideas is
"liberty"-a concept reinvigorated by Justice Anthony Kennedy, in
particular, in several decisions over the past decade."
might be a verdant paradise in comparison. The First Amendment
interests here are, therefore, broader than merely those of the
filmmaker, distributor, and exhibitor, and certainly broader than those
of youths under 16.
Id. at 684. The Court also stressed that it is no
[A]nswer to an argument that a particular regulation of expression is
vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose of protecting
children. The permissible extent of vagueness is not directly
proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the power to regulate or
control expression with respect to children."
Id. at 689.
124. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591
(1982).
125. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality
opinion). See also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 729Summer 20141
Because both reasons are fully in play when adults' rights are at
stake, we do not always appreciate that they are independent. But
when we discuss children's rights, it is unavoidable that we do so. It
would be difficult to overstate the degree to which adults' rights and
children's rights differ under American law. It is far more than
merely that "[tihe state's authority over children's activities is
broader than over the like actions of adults." 126  Although both
possess many of the same rights, children do not possess the same
liberty rights that adults do. Indeed, American law is framed on the
understanding that children lack the basic right to liberty. As the
Supreme Court put it in 1984, juveniles, "unlike adults, are always in
some form of custody."'27
Moreover, "custody" is more than a physical concept; its deeper
meaning is that children are always the responsibility of an adult.
Moreover, the adult (usually a child's parent, guardian, or school
teacher) who is responsible for the child has the authority to make
life-changing decisions for her. The condition of children (some
regard it as their plight),'2 in other words, could not be more different
in terms of liberty, than the condition of being an adult.
Whereas adults get to choose where to live, what to do with their
lives, the people with whom they associate, their religion, and all
other qualities of their lives that constitute the full meaning of liberty,
children lack all of these choices. They get to live the lives they
choose (during their childhood) only if they are able to persuade their
parents or guardians to let them.
126. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
127. Schall v. Martin, 465 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citation omitted). See also Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993):
The "freedom from physical restraint" invoked by respondents is not
at issue in this case. Surely not in the sense of shackles, chains, or
barred cells, given the Juvenile Care Agreement. Nor even in the
sense of a right to come and go at will, since, as we have said
elsewhere, "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody," and where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails,
the government may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise
custody itself or appoint someone else to do so.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
128. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS VS. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
(1998); James G. Dwyer, Parents Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine
of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371 (1994). Others, myself included, celebrate the
rights of parents in their authority to make all significant decisions regarding their
children's upbringing. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS (2005).
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Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
serves to protect children against wrongful deprivations of liberty,129
the Court has ruled that a child's liberty interest is considerably less
than an adult's.'" This means that, more than adults, children may be
more easily detained before trial when accused of crimes, and they
are also subject to searches at public school under conditions that
would plainly be unconstitutional if conducted on adults."' Children,
both at home and at public school, are lawfully subject to "a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults." 13 2
It is true that the Court wrote in 1967 that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,"133
and has repeated the idea many times.'" Children, "in school as well
as out of school," the Court added in 1969, "are 'persons' under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect."135 Less than a decade later, the Court explained
that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights.",1 6
But these platitudes do not come close to capturing the true
picture of children's rights.
129. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
130. Id. at 265. Courts have also upheld nonemergency juvenile curfew laws on the
reasoning that they advance the important state interest of protecting children from
potential harm and protecting the community from misbehavior of youth. See, e.g.,
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 848-49 (4th Cir. 1998). For a thorough
review of the case law concerning juvenile curfews, see generally Harvard Law Review
Association, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion Over Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2400 (2005).
131. See Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-51 (1995).
132. Id. at 655. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (Court rejected
junior high school students' challenge to practice of corporal punishment consisting of
"paddling the recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring
less than two feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick,"
commonly "limited to one to five 'licks' or blows with the paddle.").
133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
134. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 288 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion); Carey v. Population Servs.
Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (plurality opinion); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 532 (1971).
135. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
136. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976).
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Children's rights are severely limited not only in terms of
physical liberty and privacy. Whether they are allowed to go to
school and to church are decisions assigned to their guardians to
make on their behalf. Moreover, this is not some accidental
consequence of history. In 2000, the Court wrote, "[T]he interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children ... is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court."'
It is not an overstatement to suggest, as Justice Lewis Powell did
in 1979, that parental control over their children's upbringing,
including what values they are taught, what beliefs they are exposed
to, which God to pray to, if any, is one of the basic structural
arrangements of American society."' Justice Powell explained that
the "Court has jealously guarded the "unique role in our society of
the family, the institution by which we inculcate and pass down many
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural... .""3 Even more,
parental authority over children is the bedrock of ultimate liberty in
adulthood. "Properly understood," Justice Powell wrote, "the
tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of
individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter."
Consider the foundational cases establishing the twin points
being made here: First, state officials must be restrained in interfering
with child rearing decisions, particularly those involving value
inculcation; and second, that parents have the constitutional right to
raise their children as they see fit. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law that restricted what children could be
taught before the eighth grade. 4' In explaining that the state lacks the
power to create a Spartan society in which children are reared by the
state in a way that best serves the state's interests, the Court stressed
that this authority rests with the parents themselves.'42 Again, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that Oregon could not
constitutionally require that children attend public school (although it
could insist that children be educated). 43 But the struggle was over
137. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
138. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
139. Id. at 634.
140. Id. at 638-39.
141. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
142. Id. at 403.
143. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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who gets to shape children, not whether children have any rights to
make these important choices for themselves.
In 1944, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court resolved an
argument between adults over who gets to decide important child
rearing decisions." It is instructive in Prince to focus on the
substantive right at issue: religion. In that case a nine-year-old
practicing member of her church was performing her duties as a
minister by proselytizing on Boston's streets at 8 p.m. According to
her beliefs, she had to perform this role or suffer condemnation at
Armageddon.145 But the Court treated the child as completely lacking
the First Amendment freedom of religion.46 It upheld a statute that
punished her caregiver for allowing her to be out on the street. The
case stands for the important principle that parental rights are limited
and that the state may interfere with those rights to protect children
from harm. But, in deciding which authority could decide for the
child, the child herself was not an option.
The combination of Meyer, Pierce, and Prince, which established
the parental rights doctrine as a vital aspect of American
constitutional democracy,'147 answered the crucial question of who
decides the details of a child's upbringing. Implicit in answering that
question, however, was the notion that the decision rests with
someone other than the child herself.
When the next parental rights case reached the Court in 1972,
the implicit was made explicit. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,48 the Court
had to decide whether Wisconsin officials or the parents of fifteen-
year-old Amish children had the authority to determine whether the
children should continue going to school. State officials wanted the
children to continue in their studies. The parents did not. Even
though the Court appreciated that either decision would have a
monumental impact on the children's future, the Court comfortably
concluded that the decision was the parents' to make.149 Only Justice
144. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
145. Id. at 163.
146. Id. at 170. Justice Murphy dissented. Id. at 172 ("Religious training and activity,
whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against
interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable regulations adopted
for the protection of the public health, morals and welfare." (Murphy, J., dissenting).
147. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 17-49
(2007).
148. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
149. Id. at 234-35.
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William Douglas cared what the children themselves wanted."o Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court addressed Justice Douglas'
point, observing that recognizing the claim that children have the
right to oppose their parents' educational decisions would constitute
''an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious
training" which "would give rise to grave questions of religious
freedom."n'
Several years later, in 1979, the Court found that another
constitutional right afforded adults did not apply equally to children
when it held that parents have the constitutional right to place their
children in state mental hospitals as voluntary patients even when the
children oppose being there. The Court dismissed the children's
objections with the observation that "[s]imply because the decision of
a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does
not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the
parents to some agency or officer of the state."152 Parents, the Court
explained, have extraordinary power to make decisions regarding
their children because "parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions."153
150. Id. at 244-45. In his dissent, Justice Douglas wrote:
On this important and vital matter of education, I think the children
should be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent,
normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a
matter on which the child will often have decided views. He may want
to be a pianist or an astronaut or an oceanographer. To do so he will
have to break from the Amish tradition. It is the future of the student,
not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision. If a
parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the
child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world
of diversity that we have today. The child may decide that that is the
preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the student's judgment, not his
parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have
said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters
of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by
those in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire
life may be stunted and deformed. The child, therefore, should be
given an opportunity to be heard before the State gives the exemption
which we honor today.
Id.
151. Id. at 231 (majority opinion).
152. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 630 (1979). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622
(1979) (pregnant minors may be required to seek judicial approval to terminate a
pregnancy if they choose not to secure their parents' permission for the procedure).
153. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
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The most recent parental rights case involving a conflict between
state and parental power was resolved in the same way as Yoder. In
Troxel v. Granville,' the Court ruled that state courts may not force
parents to permit third parties to visit their children even if the court
determines that such visits are in the children's best interests. The
ruling upheld a parent's constitutional right to limit the people with
whom children may associate without requiring the parents to prove
that their choice is best, or even very good, for their children.
Moreover, parents may make this decision regardless of what the
child wants.
This fundamental point-that parents, not the state, get to decide
the upbringing of children-has two components. Depending on the
particular question being decided by the Court, the Court's attention
may be only on the one, ignoring the other, because the case did not
provide an opportunity to address it. One component is what state
officials may not do, and the other component is what parents' rights
are.
The cases discussed thus far in Part II reveal the extent to which
parents may make critical decisions for their children-and the extent
to which children are denied the liberty to help make basic decisions
about themselves. To complete the background review necessary to
analyze the Brown decision in Part III, we will next look to various
Supreme Court cases that have addressed First Amendment rights
involving children.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,"' the question
before the Court was whether school officials could compel students
to salute the flag and say the pledge of allegiance each day as part of
the curriculum."' The Court held that government lacks the power to
compel any of its citizens to publicly demonstrate their agreement
with ideas or views that the government deems correct.
The Court held the mandatory flag salute provision
unconstitutional because it compelled "a form of utterance,""' which
"requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his
154. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
155. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
156. Id. at 629-30.
157. See id. at 641 ("We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of
Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here
is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.").
158. Id. at 632.
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acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks."'" In addition, the
Court observed that the combination of requiring a flag salute with
utterance of the pledge of allegiance "requires affirmation of a belief
and an attitude of mind."'60 The opinion emphasized the potential
ultimate cost to society, adults and children included, if state officials
were permitted to force any citizens, but particularly children, to
express a particular view. "There is no mysticism in the American
concept of the State or of the nature or origin of its authority," Justice
Jackson wrote. "We set up government by consent of the governed,
and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to
coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public
opinion, not public opinion by authority."16'
As I have explained elsewhere, "neither the Court's holding nor
Justice Jackson's reasoning depended on an understanding that
children possessed rights which the Constitution protected. Instead,
the case stands for the closely related, but materially different, point
that state officials must be constrained in their use of power,
particularly when applying it to children."' 62 As Justice Robert
Jackson famously emphasized:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us."
The meaning of Barnette is plain: State officials may not force
anyone, including children, to affirm a belief in an idea espoused by
state officials. This was an extremely important case about the limits
of state power, and the ruling focused on constraining state power
because of the risks associated with unleashing it. The decision is not
159. Id. at 633.
160. Id. ("To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of
Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.").
161. Id. at 641.
162. Martin Guggenheim, Maximizing Strategies for Pressuring Adults to Do Right by
Children, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 769 (2003).
163. Id. at 642.
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a statement about children's rights, except as a corollary principle.
But even the corollary principle needs to be carefully explained lest
we run the risk of missing the larger point.
After Barnette, we may accurately say that children have the
right not to be forced by state officials to express a belief. But the
phrase "by state officials" is the key to a full understanding of the
rule. Barnette certainly does not stand for the principle that children
have the right not to be forced to express a belief. Parents may force
them (or attempt to force them). And agents for parents, for example
teachers in private or church schools, may do so as well.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,'" public school officials were denied the authority to punish
students for participating in an anti-war demonstration at school.'
Proclaiming that students in public schools do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"'" the Court held that students may not be
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises unless school authorities have reason to believe that such
expression will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students."167
Despite the broad language in Tinker, however, no Supreme
Court case since then has held restrictions on student speech rights to
be unconstitutional. In 1982, in Board of Education v. Pico,'6 the
Court recognized the authority of school officials not to include in
their libraries vulgar (nonobscene) material over a contrary claim by
students that such materials should be made available to those
students who want them.'6 In 1986, in Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser,' school officials successfully defended their authority to
restrict the speech of school children and punish students for speech
in order to teach student speakers proper manners."' Two years later,
164. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
165. Id. at 508.
166. Id. at 506.
167. Id. at 509.
168. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
169. Id. at 871-72.
170. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
171. Id. at 681. The Court wrote,
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well
described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic.... It must inculcate the
habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to
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in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,1' school officials won the right to censor
student speech by removing several pages of the newspaper without
allowing any input into the decision by the editors.'73
In 2007, in Morse v. Frederick,"' the Court even allowed a high
school principal to punish a student for refusing to take down a sign
that the principal reasonably interpreted to have advocated drug
use.7  Recognizing that "the State has an interest 'to protect the
welfare of children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded from
abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens,"',7 the Court upheld the statute. In
so doing, the Court explained that "[t]he State .. . has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth"'" and that "[t]he well-being of
its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate." 78
With the combined background of cases in Parts I and II, we are
now prepared to analyze and critique the 2011 decision in Brown.
happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in
the community and the nation."
Id.
172. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
173. See id. at 273. The Hazelwood petitioners stated in their brief:
The constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.
The Court has acknowledged the importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and as a means
of inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system. [L]ocal school boards must be permitted
to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit
community values, and... there is a legitimate and substantial
community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional
values be they social, moral, or political.
Brief for Petitioners at 27, Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (No. 86-836), 1987 WL 864172
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
174. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
175. Id. at 410.
176. Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
177. Id. at 640.
178. Id. at 639. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart's explanation for the rule that
children have fewer First Amendment rights than adults, which has been widely repeated
by the Court ever since, is that "at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like
someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a
premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights-the right to
marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally
intolerable for adults." Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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IH. The Brown Decision
In Brown, the Supreme Court, for the first time ever, declared
unconstitutional a state law that did not implicate adults' access to
protected material but prevented children from purchasing, except
through their parents, material found unfit for children by state
officials. This is a groundbreaking decision. In describing and
analyzing it, among the things we shall consider is whether the
Court's reasoning is sound.
In Brown, a California law prohibited the sale or rental of
"violent video games" to minors, and required their packaging to be
labeled "18."' The covered games included those "in which the
range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming,
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if
those acts are depicted" in a manner that "[a] reasonable person,
considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or
morbid interest of minors," that is "patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors," and
that "causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors."' The statute was enacted
after the Legislature convened extensive hearings and made findings
that many of the games that minors were permitted to play had the
potential to be very harmful to them. The Legislature found that
"[e]xposing minors to depictions of violence in video games, including
sexual and heinous violence, makes those minors more likely to
experience feelings of aggression, to experience a reduction of activity
in the frontal lobes of the brain, and to exhibit violent antisocial or
aggressive behavior," and that "even minors who do not commit acts
of violence suffer psychological harm from prolonged exposure to
violent video games."8
Before the law went into effect, it was challenged in federal
district court, where the law was declared unconstitutional and its
enforcement was permanently enjoined."" After the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court order, the Supreme Court granted
California's petition for certiorari." In the Supreme Court, all of the
179. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (2009).
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (2009). Violation of the law is punishable by a
civil fine of up to $1,000. Id. at § 1746.3.
181. 2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 638 (Assemb. B. 1179, § 1).
182. Video Software Dealers Assn. v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007
WL 2261546 at *2.
183. Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 559 U.S. 1092 (2010).
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parties agreed that video games enjoy protection under the First
Amendment.' The Supreme Court agreed with the lower federal
courts that the statute was unconstitutional.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the
Supreme Court has "long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish
politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try."" The Court
added that video games, along with "books, plays, and movies,"
"communicate ideas-and even social messages-through many
familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music)
and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's
interaction with the virtual world)." For the Court, "[t]hat suffices to
confer First Amendment protection. "'
The majority opinion focused on the dangers associated with
carving out a new art form or conferring power of censorship on state
officials because they disapprove of the material's content. As it
emphasized, quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc.,'" "[u]nder our Constitution, 'esthetic and moral judgments about
art and literature ... are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority.""" The Court further pointed out that "the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary" when a new and different medium for
communication appears.8 9
The Court explained that its holding in United States v. Stevens'
"controls this case." "[N]ew categories of unprotected speech may
not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech
is too harmful to be tolerated." Further, California's claim that it may
punish speech that it deems harmful is "startling and dangerous." 91
After finding the law unconstitutional because the speech the law
sought to suppress was protected by the First Amendment, the Court
rejected California's claim that the law should be upheld because it
184. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
185. Id. (adding "Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." (citing Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948))).
186. Id.
187. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
188. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818).
189. Id. (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
190. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
191. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
740 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:4
"mimics the New York statute regulating obscenity-for-minors that"
that the Court upheld in Ginsberg v. New York." The majority
opinion factually distinguished Ginsberg, explaining that the New
York law prohibited "the sale to minors of sexual material that would
be obscene from the perspective of a child."' 3 In its words, "[t]he
California Act is something else entirely."'" Unlike Ginsberg, Justice
Scalia wrote, the California law "does not adjust the boundaries of an
existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition
designed for adults is not uncritically applied to children.""
"Instead," he went on, "it wishes to create a wholly new category of
content-based regulation that is permissible only for speech directed
at children. That is unprecedented and mistaken."'
Not only is there no "longstanding tradition in this country of
specially restricting children's access to depictions of violence,""
Justice Scalia explained, children's literature is rife with violence.
The majority opinion then briefly summarized some American
history that included condemnation of new media for its impact on
children (including dime novels in the 1800s blamed for juvenile
delinquency,'" motion pictures when they began,2" radio dramas,
comic books,20' television and music lyrics2"). The Court rejected
California's claim that "video games present special problems
192. Id. at 2735.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2736.
198. Id. (referencing, among other works, Snow White, Cinderella, and Hansel and
Gretel as particular examples of literature for young children. He also references Homer's
The Odyssey, Dante's Inferno, and Golding's Lord of the Flies as material containing
graphic violence and made widely available to high school students.)
199. Id. at 2737 (citing Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae 6-7).
200. Id.
The days when the police looked upon dime novels as the most
dangerous of textbooks in the school for crime are drawing to a
close.... They say that the moving picture machine ... tends even
more than did the dime novel to turn the thoughts of the easily
influenced to paths which sometimes lead to prison.
Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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because they are 'interactive,' 203 explaining that "all literature is
interactive."2
Championing children's rights, the majority approved dictum
from Erznoznik that "minors are entitled to a significant measure of
First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-
defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them." 205 The majority also rejected the state's
exercise of a "free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which
children may be exposed."20 6
Turning to the statute's validity, Justice Scalia wrote that
"[b]ecause the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected
speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes
strict scrutiny." 207 The test for strict scrutiny is twofold: "The State
must specifically identify an 'actual problem' in need of solving,2' and
the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the
solution."2 "0 In this context, it "is a demanding standard" which
"California cannot meet."210
The Court found that no study "prove[s] that violent video
games cause minors to act aggressively." 21 1 Rather, "[t]hey show at
best some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and
minuscule real-world effects, such as children's feeling more
aggressive or making louder noises in the few minutes after playing a
violent game than after playing a nonviolent game." 212 The Court
further noted that some of the negative effects researchers claim are
produced by violent video games:
[A]re "about the same" as that produced by their
exposure to violence on television. And [the state's
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2738 (quoting Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577
(7th Cir. 2001).
205. Id. at 2735-36 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975)
(internal citation omitted)).
206. Id. at 2736.
207. Id. at 2738.
208. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822-23
(2000)).
209. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)).
210. Id. ("It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever
be permissible.") (citing Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818).
211. Id. at 2739.
212. Id.
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expert at trial] admits that the same effects have been
found when children watch cartoons starring Bugs
Bunny or the Road Runner, or when they play video
games like Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated "E"
(appropriate for all ages), or even when they "vie[w] a
picture of a gun." 21
Mocking California, the majority observed that "California has
(wisely) declined to restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale of
games rated for young children, or the distribution of pictures of
guns."214  But it then condemned California for being "wildly
underinclusive," "which in our view is alone enough to defeat it." 2 15
"Underinclusiveness," the Court wrote, "raises serious doubts about
whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes,
rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint. Here,
California has singled out the purveyors of video games for
disfavored treatment-at least when compared to booksellers,
cartoonists, and movie producers." 216
Additionally, the Court found the law underinclusive for a
different reason: California would permit minors to play video games
with their parents' permission.217 In the majority's voice, "[tihe
California Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this dangerous,
mind-altering material in the hands of children so long as one parent
(or even an aunt or uncle) says it's OK." 218
The majority opinion also found that California failed even to
show that parents need the help the law offers (the Court wrote that
California "cannot show that the Act's restrictions meet a substantial
need of parents who wish to restrict their children's access to violent
video games but cannot do so.")219 According to the Court, this is
because "[t]he video-game industry has in place a voluntary rating
system designed to inform consumers about the content of games";220
the industry "encourages retailers to prominently display information
213. Id. (emphasis and citations omitted).
214. Id. at 2740.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
Summer 2014] VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 743
about the [rating] system in their stores" ;221 and the industry expects
retailers "to refrain from renting or selling adults-only games to
minors; and to rent or sell "M" rated games to minors only with
parental consent." 22  Altogether, Justice Scalia concluded, the
industry's efforts do "much to ensure that minors cannot purchase
seriously violent games on their own, and that parents who care about
the matter can readily evaluate the games their children bring
home."223 In this light, whatever gains to parents additional legislation
adds, "can hardly be a compelling state interest." 224
The Court's final objection was that the law's "purported aid to
parental authority is vastly overinclusive," 225 because "[n]ot all of the
children who are forbidden to purchase violent video games on their
own have parents who care whether they purchase violent video
games."226
Summarizing the reasons the Court struck the law, the majority
reiterated:
As a means of protecting children from portrayals of
violence, the legislation is seriously underinclusive, not
only because it excludes portrayals other than video
games, but also because it permits a parental or
avuncular veto. And as a means of assisting concerned
parents it is seriously overinclusive because it abridges
the First Amendment rights of young people whose
parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video
games are a harmless pastime. And the overbreadth
in achieving one goal is not cured by the underbreadth
in achieving the other. Legislation such as this, which
is neither fish nor fowl, cannot survive strict scrutiny.227
Justice Samuel Alito, along with Chief Justice John Roberts,
concurred in the result but concluded that the law was
unconstitutional for very different reasons than the majority. Justice
Alito expressly disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the case
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2741.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id at 2742.
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was "controlled" by Stevens.22 Explaining that Stevens addressed the
constitutionality of a statute that banned material even for adults, the
California statute in question did not interfere at all with adults'
opportunity to have access to the material. In the taxonomy of this
Article, Justice Alito explained that a Category A case cannot control
a Category D inquiry. But Justice Alito also explained that even laws
designed only to limit children's access to material otherwise
protected by the First Amendment (Category D cases) cases are
subject to the requirement that they be written with sufficient clarity
that they not entrap vendors into violating the law.229
Justice Alito would have held that California's attempt to adapt
the Miller test for obscenity to the subject of violence does not work
well enough to survive review on vagueness grounds.2" The problem
identified by Justice Alito is that the law applies to all video games
meeting the threshold requirement of including "killing, maiming,
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being."231
Once this threshold test is met, games are within the law when "(i) [a]
reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find [the
game] appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors; (ii) [i]t is
patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to
what is suitable for minors; [and] (iii) [i]t causes the game, as a whole,
to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors."232
Justice Alito further explained that Miller restricts the law in
question to "hardcore" acts, such as "masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.""' The problem with
adapting the Miller test to violence is "our society has long regarded
many depictions of killing and maiming as suitable features of
popular entertainment, including entertainment that is widely
available to minors." 234 The California law's threshold requirement
would more closely resemble the limitation in Miller if it targeted a
narrower class of graphic depictions.
228. Id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 2743 ("These principles apply to laws that regulate expression for the
purpose of protecting children.") See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689
(1968).
230. Id. at 2743-47 (Alito, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 2744 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
232. Id. (citation omitted).
233. Id. (citation omitted).
234. Id. at 2745.
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This means that the weight of California law's providing fair
notice to vendors of what falls within its ambit rests entirely on the
"community standards" test. In applying this test, a court looks at the
"prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for
minors,"23 or whether "[a] reasonable person, considering [a] game as
a whole," would find that it "appeals to a deviant or morbid interest
of minors." ' According to Justice Alito, this test does not do the
job."' Vendors of any material, whether it is fully protected by the
First Amendment, partially protected, or entirely unprotected, have
an independent right to know what behavior may result in their
prosecution. 238 For Justice Alito, the challenged law fails to provide
guidance and, for that reason alone, the statute is unconstitutional.
Only Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer voted to
uphold the Act. Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion argued that
children had no right to view material over their parental objection.239
He concluded that the Founders did not intend for the "freedom of
speech" to encompass a right to speak to children by bypassing their
parents, or a right of children to access speech.24
Justice Breyer disagreed both with the majority and with Justice
Alito's concurrence. According to Justice Breyer, the majority was
wrong to limit Ginsberg's reach only to obscenity-related material.241
Justice Breyer read Ginsberg as being about protecting children from
harmful content that adults have the right to view. For him, Ginsberg
did not create a new category of impermissible speech. He
nonetheless agreed with the majority that, because the Act regulated
the distribution of material based on content, strict scrutiny was the
proper standard by which to evaluate the law.242 He concluded,
however, contrary to all other Justices, that "protecting children from
harm" was a sufficiently compelling government interest243-
reminding the reader that the Court has previously held that the
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2009).
236. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A)(i) (2009).
237. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2745 (Alito, J., concurring).
238. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
239. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 2752.
241. Id. at 2765-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 2765-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2768. Justice Breyer also concluded that the Act provides fair notice to
game manufacturers of the content that would be forbidden for minors. Id. at 2763.
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"power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adults."24
He also stressed that "the First Amendment does not disable
government from helping parents make ... a choice not to have their
children buy extremely violent, interactive video games, which they
more than reasonably fear pose only the risk of harm to those
children. ,245
He concluded that the California law advanced two compelling
state interests: "both (1) the 'basic' parental claim 'to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their children,' which
makes it proper to enact 'laws designed to aid discharge of [parental]
responsibility,' and (2) the State's 'independent interest in the well-
being of its youth."' 246 Nor did he agree that the law was fatal simply
because California chose "to advance its interests in protecting
children against the special harms present in an interactive video
game medium through a default rule that still allows parents to
provide their children with what their parents wish." 247
Justice Breyer had particular difficulty reconciling the state of
the law after the majority's opinion in Brown, assuming that Ginsberg
remains good law. As he expressed it, there is currently "a serious
anomaly in First Amendment law."24 "Ginsberg," he explained,
"makes clear that a State can prohibit the sale to minors of depictions
of nudity; today the Court makes clear that a State cannot prohibit
the sale to minors of the most violent interactive video games."2 49 He
then asked:
But what sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-
year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude
woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of
an interactive video game in which he actively, but
virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and
kills her? What kind of First Amendment would
permit the government to protect children by
restricting sales of that extremely violent video game
244. Id. at 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
170 (1944)).
245. Id. at 2771.
246. Id. at 2767 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S., at 639-640).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2771.
249. Id.
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only when the woman-bound, gagged, tortured, and
killed-is also topless? 25 0
IV. Critique
The careful reader has hopefully already seen the serious flaws in
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court. Most obviously, he relied
exclusively on Categories A, B, and C cases to reach the conclusion
that the California law is unconstitutional. Although it may be
appropriate to refer to Categories A and B (and even C) cases when
analyzing the constitutionality of a Category D case, it surely cannot
be correct that the Category A Stevens decision controls the result in
Brown.251
How could the Court go so far off track? One answer is circular.
The majority relied on all of the cases already cited to support the
proposition that a ban on violent videos games could not survive the
result in Stevens. On that particular point, the majority is
undoubtedly correct. The problem, however, is that the California
law is not any kind of ban. It is a classic Category D case in which the
law does nothing more than limit the conditions under which minors
may access violent video games. Indeed, in two important senses, it is
not a ban. The law does not interfere in the slightest with an adult's
freedom to access and play video games. Nor is it even a ban on
children's use of them. The law expressly permits children to use the
games. All the law does is limit the conditions under which children
may gain access to them in the first place.252
Perhaps the most ludicrous aspect of the majority's opinion was
criticizing California for enacting a law that was "underinclusive"
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The Court is wrong in saying that the holding
in United States v. Stevens controls this case. First, the statute in Stevens differed sharply
from the statute at issue here. Stevens struck down a law that broadly prohibited any
person from creating, selling, or possessing depictions of animal cruelty for commercial
gain. The California law involved here, by contrast, is limited to the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors. The California law imposes no restriction on the creation
of violent video games, or on the possession of such games by anyone, whether above or
below the age of 18. The California law does not regulate the sale or rental of violent
games by adults. And the California law does not prevent parents and certain other close
relatives from buying or renting violent games for their children or other young relatives if
they see fit.") (internal citation omitted).
252. Justice Scalia is adept at characterizing the very.same error he made in Brown, at
least when he perceives the error in others. See, e.g., Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for
Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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because it permitted minors to play video games with their parent's
permission. 253  The "ban," in other words, was unconstitutional
because it was not a ban. But only Justice Scalia labeled it a ban in
the first place. One would hope that if the majority could see that the
law permitted parents to make the games available to their children,
it could also recognize that the law was not a ban.
None of this means, by itself, that the California law should have
been upheld. I agree with Justices Alito and Roberts that the
California law was fatally overbroad and should have been declared
unconstitutional. What is important here, however, is to clarify that,
thus far, the majority has not made a satisfactory case for the law's
unconstitutionality and its description of the law as a ban allowed it to
rely on tangential cases that cannot carry the day."
The case, above all others, that belongs prominently in the
conversation is Ginsberg.2 5  But Ginsberg would be very poor
precedent for the majority to begin with for the simple reason that
Ginsberg applied a rational basis test in reviewing the legality of New
York's requirement that minors may not purchase certain sexually
explicit, non-obscene material except with their parents' permission.
Recall Justice Brennan's exceedingly generous test in reviewing the
legality of that law: to sustain the law "requires only that we be able
to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to
minors."25 6 But the majority's goal was to apply strict scrutiny to the
California law, a test that could not be further from Ginsberg's.
As this Article has shown, an important set of second generation
First Amendment questions that needed to be resolved was whether
there could be any limits imposed on the distribution of materials
suitable for adults because of the concern that they might end up in
the hands of children. The inquiry is invariably the same. How do we
balance the state's legitimate interest in assisting parents in raising
253. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2740.
254. All of the cases cited by Justice Scalia supporting his conclusion that prior
precedents "control" the result that the law is unconstitutional were non-Category D
cases: United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc. (Category C); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson (Category A); Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (Category B); United
States v. Stevens (Category A); R.A.V. v. St. Paul (Category A); Roth v. United States
(Category B); Brandenburg v. Ohio (Category A); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
(Category A); Miller v. California (Category A); Cohen v. California (Category A); and
Winters v. New York (Category B). Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
255. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2747 (Alito, J., concurring) (calling Ginsberg "our most
closely related precedent").
256. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
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their children by shielding them from a cascade of materials to which
many parents do not wish their children to have ready access with the
independent right of adults to gain ready access to the same things?
Many of the key cases decided over the past sixty years are nothing
but an attempt to address this problem. For the most part, these
cases are framed within the same broad outline: Adults have an
unfettered right to access to these materials; children do not. Until
Brown.
In the lower federal courts, the California Attorney General
stressed the State's independent interest in the well-being of children.
California defended the law as furthering the State's "compelling
interest in preventing harm to minors caused by the unique
interactive media of video games.",17 It justified the law as advancing
the State's interest in developing "healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens,"" arguing that the State
may lawfully protect children "from exposure to material that would
'impair[] [their] ethical and moral development.""'
The California Attorney General also stressed that the
Legislature found that watching violent video games can cause harm
to minors because it (a) "causes increases in aggressive thoughts,
affect, and behaviour; increases in physiological arousal; and
decreases in helpful behaviour";260 (b) increases the risk children
would be more likely to be involved in physical fights, and perform
more poorly in school;261 and (c) leads to desensitization to violence in
minors and impacts their brain activity. The Attorney General's
brief explained that the California Psychiatric Association
encouraged the Legislature to enact the law in order to "lessen[] not
only aggression, but symptoms of anxiety, depression, agitation and
social isolation for many young people already predisposed to
257. Appellants' Opening Brief, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 07-
16620, No. C-05-4188-RMW, at 24 (9th Cir. 2008).
258. Id. at 26 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)).
259. Id. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641).
260. Id. at 30 (citing Craig Anderson et al., American Psychological Society, The
Influence of Media Violence on Youth, 4 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, No. 3, at 91-93 (Dec. 2003)).
261. Id. at 30 (citing Gentile, The Effects of Violent Video Game Habits on Adolescent
Hostility, Aggressive Behaviors, and School Performance, 27 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 5
(2004)).
262. Id. at 31.
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behavioral problems or with Severely Emotionally Disturbed
diagnoses, or with Severe Persistent Mental Illness."263
Stressing this purpose may not have been sound strategy for the
Attorney General." The California Legislature, however, made it
very difficult to ignore this purpose. As justification for enacted, the
law, the California Legislature declared that:
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of violence in video
games, including sexual and heinous violence, makes
those minors more likely to experience feelings of
aggression, to experience a reduction of activity in the
frontal lobes of the brain, and to exhibit violent
antisocial or aggressive behavior. (b) Even minors
who do not commit acts of violence suffer
psychological harm from prolonged exposure to
violent video games.""
All of this set up very nicely for the majority to identify the
principal flaw in the statute's goal of preventing children from gaining
access to disfavored material. Even though the law did not make it
illegal for children to play violent games, once the Court concluded
that the Legislature enacted the law to make it unlikely that children
would play the games, it was expectable that the majority would be
concerned that the state's principal goal was to deter children from
playing violent games and that anything further it said in support of
the law was merely pretext.
263. Id. at 33.
264. Indeed, the Attorney General changed the argument in the Supreme Court after
losing in the Ninth Circuit. This time around, the brief stressed,
The Act promotes parental authority to restrict unsupervised minors'
ability to consume a narrow category of material in order to protect
minors' physical and psychological welfare, as well as their ethical and
moral development. California has a vital interest in supporting
parental supervision over the amount of offensively violent material
minors consume. The Act ensures that parents-who have primary
responsibility for the well-being of minors-have an opportunity to
involve themselves in deciding what level of video game violence is
suitable for a particular minor. In doing so, the Act does not impinge
upon the rights of adults, as it was deliberately structured to
accommodate parental authority over minors while leaving access by
adults completely unfettered.
Petitioners' Brief, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, No. 08-1448, at *6 (2010).
265. 2005 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 638 (Assemb. B. 1179, § 1).
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A. Things the Court Got Right
Viewing the law through this lens, the majority opinion was
correct in a number of key respects. First, it was correct in rejecting
California's effort to place video games outside of ordinary First
Amendment regulation as a new genre materially different from
anything that came before. If one wants to avoid being ridiculed by a
future generation, the safest course, by far, is to withhold judgment
about the dangers of a new medium or method of communication for
at least a generation. History, including very recent American
history, is filled with examples of efforts to censor material on
grounds of its fitness for good people or children that, often within
less than a generation, have come to be viewed as laughable. This
history of efforts to censor that which soon enough became accepted
as mainstream, even tame, should serve as an important restraint on
anyone considering banning what appears at the moment to be edgy
material.6
As the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund's amicus brief in Brown
reported:
Past crusades leave behind a cultural sense of
curious bemusement, as if it is difficult to imagine
what all the fuss was about. But that does not prevent
social reformers and state legislatures from latching on
to the next cause ctlibre that unquestionably will lead
to the ruination of America's children unless decisive
action is taken. Unfortunately, such cycles of outrage
leave behind a legacy of censorship.267
Such concerns foreshadowed later campaigns
against music, but by then, the critics had forgotten
how foolish those efforts looked from a historical
266. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69-72 (1961) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting) (describing how in 1950, Atlanta banned Lost Boundaries, a film about a black
physician and his family who "passed" for white, on grounds that exhibition of the film
would "adversely affect the peace, morals and good order" of the community; in 1959,
Ohio censors deleted scenes of orphans resorting to violence in the film It Happened in
Europe; in 1959, the Chicago licensing board banned newsreel films of Chicago policemen
shooting at labor pickets and refused a license to exhibit the film Anatomy of a Murder,
and, in 1937-38, the New York film licensing board censored over five percent of the
movies it reviewed).
267. Brief for Comic Book Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, No. 08-1448, at *4 (2010).
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perspective. Responding to demands like this, NBC in
1940 banned from the radio more than 140 songs
because they allegedly encouraged "a disrespect for
virginity, mocked marriage, and encouraged sexual
promiscuity." Duke Ellington's The Mooche was
blamed for inciting rape, and only the instrumental
version of Cole Porter's Love for Sale could be aired.2 6
In the federal litigation in Brown, California had a very difficult
time supporting the Legislature's conclusion that playing violent
video games is bad for children or that it contributes to criminal or
violent misbehavior by children who play them. The Court was surely
right to be wary of state power to limit what children may read to
what state officials believe is suitable for them. This is particularly
true when California patterned its law on the Ginsberg statute. The
Ginsberg test was never really any kind of test at all. Allowing states
to censor material from children whenever one concludes it is "not
irrational to believe the materials may be harmful to children"269
provides virtually no check on state power. The true meaning of the
Ginsberg test is that anything may be censored except when it is
irrational to believe it is harmful to children.
Between 1968, when Ginsberg was decided, and 2011, when
Brown was announced, the black letter law was that states may limit
harmful material to children, at least when the material involved sex
or "vulgar" language, whenever a court found it was not irrational to
believe the material was inappropriate for children. Although the
Brown Court explained that Ginsberg was always only about sex,
neither Ginsberg nor any other case ever said so. Instead, the
Ginsberg Court spoke in much broader terms, recognizing the state's
interest in "preventing distribution to children of objectionable
material" and of "books recognized to be suitable for adults."2 70 On
the same day Ginsberg was decided, the Court described Ginsberg as
allowing states to "regulate the dissemination to juveniles of ...
material objectionable as to them. ... "2 Again in 1978, the Pacifica
Court likewise listed as material properly kept from children, not
merely material containing sexual language, but language that was
268. Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
269. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,641 (1968).
270. Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668,671 (N.Y. 1966)).
271. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968).
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"vulgar," "indecent," "offensive," "shocking," "unseemly," and "not
conforming to generally accepted standards of morality." 272
Looking back on the turbulent 1960s long after the First
Amendment wars were won, Ginsberg may seem difficult to justify.
But it was an extremely important decision, necessary in its time to
secure and advance adult rights, as its author, Justice Brennan,
undoubtedly understood well. Indeed, it is fascinating to observe
Justice Brennan's Ginsberg test being ridiculed today as toothless. 273
Brennan's method, borne out by experience, was that only by creating
a double standard for children and adults would it be possible to have
maximum freedom for the adults-only group. I suspect many readers
today would be very surprised to look back at the photos that were
banned by the Ginsberg Court in 1968. Playboy and Penthouse were
the two mainstream "men's magazines" in those years, both of which
were included in the materials covered by the Ginsberg statute.274
Though the centerfolds were nude, their genitals were never on
display. It did not take very long for the racy Playboy, which shocked
the country with its centerfold when the magazine first appeared in
1953, to seem staid once Larry Flynt joined the field and published his
much more explicit Hustler Magazine.275
A standard that blinked at a legislature's choice to forbid
children access to racy material was a very fair trade off to achieve a
broadening of material for adults. Indeed, if children are seen as
future adults, delaying their right to gain access to material that would
not otherwise be permitted in the marketplace expands the freedom
of both adults today and adults tomorrow (today's children).276 It may
go too far to suggest that Justice Brennan could see how successful his
compromise would turn out. But no one will ever know for certain
whether the remarkable expansion of what came to be treated as non-
pornographic material which began in the late 1960s and accelerated
in the 1970s would have been possible had the more liberal Justices
272. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1977). Justice Powell's concurrence
explained that "speech from which society may attempt to shield its children is not limited
to that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest." Id. at 758.
273. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Ginsberg did not insist on social scientific evidence that quasi-obscene images are
harmful to children. The Court, as we have noted, thought this a matter of common sense.
It was in 1968; it may not be today; but that is not our case.").
274. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-33.
275. Hustler Magazine was first published in 1974. Larry Flynt, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilLarryFlynt (last visited May 5, 2014).
276. See Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights 141 (2007).
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Douglas and Fortas, both of whom dissented in Ginsberg, prevailed in
that case and insisted that children had the same right as adults to
enjoy nude pictures.
Nevertheless, permitting the state a direct role in protecting
children from violent imagery invites censors into an impossible
inquiry: Which imagery is too much for reasonable adults to want
children to see? Justice Scalia was surely right when he explained
that there is no "longstanding tradition in this country of specially
restricting children's access to depictions of violence." 27 There are
simply too many examples of violence in children's literature, both
high- and low-brow, to permit a meaningful inquiry into where the
line ought to be drawn. My wife and I loved to read Little Red
Riding Hood to our young children as they were growing up through
the children's literature classics. But I have come to know parents
who would not expose their children to the violent themes of the
story, and sincerely believe no parent should. When courts are
instructed to decide this question on the basis of "community
standards," it quickly becomes manifest that there is no such thing.
When we add that these "standards" are supposed to gauge what
adults think are appropriate for minors, we invite an exponential
factor of ambiguity. Before too long, it becomes clear we are not
talking about any kind of standard at all.
For this reason, when Justice Scalia distinguished sex in Ginsberg
from violence in Brown, he was surely right. As he explained,
depictions of sexually salacious material in children's literature, if not
unknown, are extremely unusual.2 78 The same cannot be said for
violence. Violence is a central feature of expression intended for
minors."
In light of all this, the Court was correct to insist that state
officials prove that children, or members of society, will be harmed by
children playing violent video games before they may limit children's
opportunity to play the games for that reason alone. The Ginsberg
test, applied to support the state's independent interest in children's
well-being, was properly rejected as applied to violent video games.
Since the state could not demonstrate that playing violent video
277. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736. See, e.g., Marjorie Heins, Blaming the Media: Would
Regulation of Expression Prevent Another Columbine?, 14 MEDIA STUD. J. 14, 15 (2000).
278. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n, 244 F.3d at 578 (depictions of sex, as opposed
to depictions of violence, are "an adult invasion of children's culture"). See also NEIL
POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CHILDHOOD 72-80 (1982).
279. Brown. 131 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
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games was harmful to minors, the Court was also correct in refusing
to uphold the law for that reason.
B. The Validity of Legislation Enacted to Assist Parents Raising Their
Children
There still remains the state's second claim: The statute should
be upheld as assisting parents in raising their children. But as we
have seen, when the state enacts a law in the name of aiding parents,
how do we ever know when its true motive is to deny children the
opportunity to view protected material? Virtually all restrictions
imposed by a legislature could be defended on this basis. Given
California's legislative history-making manifest legislators' hope
that the law's effect would reduce the number of children who would
play violent video games (despite what their parents might want)-
the Brown Court cannot be faulted for choosing to reject the second
claim, too.
But it surely can be faulted for its reasoning. Putting pretextual
concerns aside for the moment, when the law is defended on the
exclusive rationale that it is an appropriate effort to assist parents
raise their children, it is unnecessary to support the contention
(because the law does not depend on its truth) that the material is
harmful to children (something that may be impossible to
accomplish).m Rather, the law is simply deferring to parental
judgment-either that it is not irrational for them to think the
material is harmful to their children or, even more straightforwardly,
the parents simply do not wish their children to have access to the
material, regardless of whether or not it is harmful.
Parents have the constitutional right to deny their children access
to materials for no better reason than they believe the material may
be harmful to them.81 Although parents have this extraordinary
range of power, that does not mean states should be required to enact
laws to help parents on all fronts. But we begin in the wrong place if
we follow Justice Scalia's lead from Brown and strike any law as
overinclusive simply because it will result in some parents being
impacted by the law who would rather there were no law in the first
280. See Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1487, 1553 (1995) ("The heart of the problem is that available research
does not supply a basis upon which one could determine with adequate certainty whether
a particular 'violent' program will cause harmful behavior.").
281. This is akin to the well-known parental authority based on nothing more than,
"because I said so."
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place. Given this, there is considerably more to say about violent
video games.
It is one thing to be wary of state officials deciding for themselves
what is suitable for children. But that does not mean government
goes too far when it strives to accommodate the needs of parents who
have strong feelings about what their children get to view. A
pluralistic society that cares about fairness and equity for all of its
members surely acts reasonably when it take reasonable steps to
address discrepant values that pluralism means to honor.
The majority's insensitivity to the legitimacy of a state interest in
supporting parents who prefer their children not play these games, is
a particularly regrettable feature of its opinion. The majority in
Brown revealed an astonishing indifference to the needs and concerns
of parents trying to navigate a cacophonic marketplace. Justice Scalia
expressed the view that conservative parents are obliged to figure out
for themselves how to limit their children's access to protected
material that the parents do not wish their children to use. Such lack
of sympathy seems to ignore the meaning of living in a free society.
Parents have the substantive right to limit their children's access even
to materials protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, parents have
the constitutional right to forbid their children's access to
constitutionally protected materials.
One of the legitimate goals of a pluralistic society should be to
strive to accommodate all parents' needs, if that is possible without an
undue restriction on any parent's freedom. As the Ginsberg Court
stated in 1968, laws further a legitimate purpose when they "support
the right of parents to deal with the morals of their children as they
see fit."m The freedom to direct a child's upbringing means, of
course, that government may not prohibit parents from teaching their
children ideas government regards as repugnant. But because that
freedom also means parents may lawfully forbid their children
exposure to ideas that government must tolerate, government
performs a legitimate function when it strives to assist parents who
care deeply about minimizing their children's exposure to materials
that adults have the right to view.
One of the most puzzling claims Justice Scalia made in Brown is
that the California law impermissibly interfered with liberal parents'
rights because it burdened their freedom to not care about which
282. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 n.7 (quoting Louis Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 413 n.68 (1963)).
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games their children purchased.283 Justice Scalia objected that the
California law unconstitutionally interfered with the rights of children
whose parents "think violent video games are a harmless pastime."a
But this ignores that whatever rules we employ, including no rules at
all, we cannot avoid burdening some parents.
It should be obvious that between two sets of parents-one that
does not mind at all what their children read or view and the other
that does-only the latter is in need of assistance from government to
accommodate their interests. The laissez-faire parent needs no
government assistance to help raise her child. The parent who
regards the marketplace as nasty and brutish does. Justice Scalia
objected that the California statute interferes with the laissez-faire
parent's rights.285 Many will scratch their heads in grasping exactly
how this is an "interference" of any kind. To be sure, it means
parents must take some steps to allow their children access to certain
games.
In a cooperative democracy that celebrates pluralism and a
maximally open marketplace of ideas, someone invariably is going to
be put upon. Parents who wish to raise their child in an environment
where words like "shit" and "tits" are not commonly spoken on
television need the government's help to keep these words out of
their living rooms. This accommodation to their values comes at a
real cost. Not only are parents of households who do not mind such
language imposed upon, all households are, including those with no
children living in them. In other words, despite the rhetoric in Brown
to the contrary, Pacifica stands for the very proposition the Brown
Court claims it has never permitted: the suppression of speech that is
unrelated to sex. Pacifica's restrictions apply to what government
officials regard as vulgari6 Moreover, they result in suppressed
speech even for adults for no better reason than to accommodate the
needs of some parents. Americans have lived with Pacifica for a
generation and most Americans are likely to agree that the ruling is a
sound compromise. The results exact a cost on many, to be sure. But
it also is the only way to meet the needs of some parents.
The California Legislature went considerably beyond what the
New York Legislature did in Ginsberg. In Ginsberg, the Court said it
was sufficient for New York legislators to believe the material was
283. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741.
284. Id. at 2742.
285. Id. at 2741.
286. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1977).
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harmful to minors. In California, the legislative inquiry before
enacting the law is best understood as an independent inquiry by
legislators into whether it is rational to believe violent videos may be
harmful to minors. Even further, the legislature may be seen to have
inquired into whether it wanted to support parents who preferred
their children not to have access to the materials. Ultimately, we may
say the California legislators concluded it was not irrational for many
parents to prefer their children not have ready access to these
materials and they enacted a law to assist those parents. In doing so,
the legislators were mindful of the proper limits of their authority and
avoided imposing a ban on children's access to the materials. This is
best seen as an attempt to accommodate the interests of all parents
and, importantly, to avoid imposing its own view on what is proper
for children.
This leaves one last extraordinary claim raised by Justice Scalia
that deserves some attention. Not only did Justice Scalia criticize the
California law for burdening laissez-faire parents, even more
remarkably, he also suggested that the California law violated
children's rights because California would have limited the games
children could play to those their parents sanctioned.2" He expressed
doubt "that the state has the power to prevent children from hearing
or saying anything without their parents' prior consent,"' giving as
an example to prove the that state lacks this power, "that it could be
made criminal to admit persons under 18 to a political rally without
their parents' prior written consent-even a political rally in support
of laws against corporal punishment of children, or laws in favor of
greater rights for minors."" Going further, he said that laws, for
example, that make it a crime "to admit a person under 18 to church,
or to give a person under 18 a religious tract, without his parents'
prior consent" "are obviously an infringement upon the religious
freedom of young people."290
It is unclear which is more remarkable: The claim that children
have the constitutional right to choose their church over their parent's
objection, or that the person making the claim is Justice Scalia, whose
track record for advancing children's rights before Brown would rank
287. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736.
288. Id. at n.3.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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him behind only Justice Thomas as the least child-friendly Justice on
the Court.291 This is the same Justice who wrote in 1995 that:
Traditionally at common law, and still today,
unemancipated minors lack some of the most
fundamental rights of self-determination-including
even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the
right to come and go at will. They are subject, even as
to their physical freedom, to the control of their
*292parents or guardians.
This time around, he suggests that children enjoy unfettered freedom
to speak their minds and join the church of their choice.
If this dictum, expressed in a footnote, were true, it would turn
on its head the foundational principles of parental rights under the
Constitution. Parents have the right to choose for their children
virtually everything including their school church, community,
friends, clothes, amount of time they may spend out of the home, as
only a few immediate examples. They also have the right in every
state to enforce their lawful commands over their children and to
seek the state's aide over their recalcitrant children by charging them
in juvenile court with disobeying the lawful command of the parent.293
But even if we were to take this footnote seriously, there is an
important distinction between granting children the freedom, even
over their parents' objection, to speak out on political matters and
granting them the freedom to disobey their parents by rejecting the
school or church their parents have chosen for them. We go very far
291. It is easy to make the case that Justice Thomas ranks as the least children's-
rights-friendly sitting Justice. His concurrence in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418
(2007), argued that children have no First Amendment rights at school because their
parents have assigned them to the school teachers who are acting as the parents' agents.
In addition, as we have seen, Justice Thomas dissented in Brown, arguing that children
have no First Amendment rights to view material over their parental objection because
the Founders did not intend for the "freedom of speech" to encompass a right to speak to
children by bypassing their parents, or a right of children to access speech. See Brown,131
S. Ct. at 2760 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But, along with Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia has
voted against children in virtually every case decided by the Court during his tenure. See,
e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct 2455 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394
(2011); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,
557 U.S. 364 (2009); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1988).
292. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654.
293. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (2010).
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in American law to protect the right of all Americans, including
children, to speak out on public events. Children may attend rallies
and participate in parades even when these gatherings are for the
purpose of supporting contested ideas.294 This is, however, an
example of children having rights because it is good for adults: Little
is lost by conferring these rights on children, and much is gained. In
this sense, granting children the right to speak out on public affairs
should also be considered the right of adults to hear what all members
of the community, including children, have to say.295
There is also a second instrumental value in permitting children
this right. We are also interested in training them to become future
voters and participants in the marketplace of ideas. 296 To further that
instrumental value, it makes sense to want children to practice
exercising their speech capacities and to absorb the feedback from
294. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 882 (1963) ("The only justification for suppressing an opinion is that those
who seek to suppress it are infallible in their judgment of the truth. But no individual or
group can be infallible, particularly in a constantly changing world."). Allowing foster
children, for example, to speak publicly about their experiences is a vital source of
material information to policy and lawmakers. As Justice Stevens explained in his
dissenting opinion in Morse, the views of minors on such public matters deserve to be
heard:
Even in high school, a rule that permits only one point of view to be
expressed is less likely to produce correct answers than the open
discussion of countervailing views. In the national debate about a
serious issue, it is the expression of the minority's viewpoint that most
demands the protection of the First Amendment. Whatever the better
policy may be, a full and frank discussion of the costs and benefits of
the attempt to prohibit the use of marijuana is far wiser than
suppression of speech because it is unpopular.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
295. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("It is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.... This right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free
society.") (internal citations omitted); Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
("It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."). See also Cass Sunstein, Free
Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263 (1992) ("the First Amendment is fundamentally
aimed at protecting democratic self-government"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 45-46 (1948) ("[E]very plan of
action must have a hearing, every relevant idea of fact or value must have full
consideration").
296. See John Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 344-48
(1979).
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peers who disagree with their views.2" This form of practicing speech
has both instrumental and immediate benefits to children and adults.
For this reason, when children are exercising their speech rights in the
form of expressing their views, we should count this as a true child's
right-not simply the consequence of rights adults insist upon for
themselves.
Thus, I agree with Emily Buss that "[s]peech offers children a
chance to pursue their self-fulfillment in a manner that minimizes the
risks associated with that pursuit and, in the process, facilitates the
development of the very capacities and stability of identity on which
full autonomy in adulthood depends." 298 To agree that the state may
not punish children for expressing their ideas299 tells us nothing about
the extent to which those charged with bringing up children are
authorized to shape their values and world outlook, even to the
extent of forbidding them from having access to ideas repugnant to
the guardians.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's footnote, it does not violate a child's
right to be denied access to particular ideas. The difference between
being a child and an adult is not a mere detail. The liberty
guaranteed by the First Amendment-the freedom to choose for
oneself what to publish, read, or view in order to promote a free trade
in ideas-presupposes the capacity of the individual to make a
reasoned choice.3
Under American law, parents have considerable authority to
expose their children to ideas important to the parents, and to limit
their child's exposure to ideas that the parents regard as antithetical
or even slightly inconsistent to their values. Thus, side by side are
two seemingly incompatible concepts: the right of free speech and a
child's burden to be limited by the choices of one's parent.
It is false to think that just because we forbid state officials from
forcing children to express a belief in something,"o' from teaching
297. See John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 42 (1991) (children
benefit from being able to articulate arguments in order to "feel the whole force of the
difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of").
298. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children's Rights, 2004 SUP. CT.
REv. 355, 381 (2004).
299. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503; Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
300. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
301. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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science in school because it is disfavored by the school board,' or
from drafting overbroad laws designed to limit the availability of
indecent sexual material to minors,3" that there is something wrong
with carefully drafted laws designed to assist parents to protect their
children from controversial materials. No one should confuse the
true meaning of the principle that "opinions and judgments, including
esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature,... are for the
individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the
mandate or approval of the majority."' The "individual" in that case
is "an adult." Children are not among the individuals who, in the
same unrestrained way as adults, get to decide for themselves what
art and literature is suitable for them.30 s Only if they happen to have
parents who give them such authority do they possess it.
The full scope of the degree to which state officials may properly
ensure that children are exposed to ideas that their parents would
prefer they not consider is beyond the focus of this Article. For
better or worse, current law strongly protects parental freedom to
teach their children what they want them to learn, and what they want
them not to know about. Our constitutional democracy forbids
forcing parents to send their children to public schools."'
Although the Court has gone very far to oversee efforts by public
school officials to restrict the base of knowledge provided to students
attending public schools, it would be misleading to conclude from the
Court's rulings in those cases that children have some kind of right to
be exposed to particular ideas.3' Those cases invariably were
concerned with restricting actions of state officials. Parents have the
constitutional right to eschew entirely the public school regime.
Indeed, it is very likely that the Court has been especially comfortable
302. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). We should remember that such lusty
language as Justice Brennan's in Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
("[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection') protected the rights of adults who were
college students.
303. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126-31 (1989). See also U.S.
v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 819-27 (2000); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975) (government may limit speech to minors "only in relatively
narrow and well-defined circumstances").
304. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818.
305. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
306. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1923).
307. See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. 97; Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
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forcing state officials to teach topics considered by some communities
to be highly contested subjects, such as evolution,3" because parents
are not obliged to use the public school regime.
Remarkably little is regulated in the private school arena. Even
more, as home schooling has grown to be the biggest movement in
education in the United States over the past generation, a significant
number of American children today are being educated in
circumstances in which there is virtually no oversight." The Court
has had almost nothing to say about any of this. As we have seen, in
the only major case ever decided by the Supreme Court on the
subject, the Court was content to leave the subject of children's
education entirely in their parents' hands, subject only to the
extremely limited conditions that they offer "some degree of
education . . . necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system ... [and prepare]
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society.""'o
We can reasonably disagree about just how far parents ought to
have the power to limit their children's education. May a parent
punish a child for reading the holy text of a religion considered
heretical by the parent? Remarkably, the answer even to that
question is far from clear.3" But however one chooses to answer it,
surely the wrong place to begin drawing lines is at violent video
games. This is to say that, at least until the limits of parental
authority to rear their late adolescent minor children is made
considerably clearer under American law than it is today, we should
not expect to determine those limits through the inquiry on violent
video games.
In light of all this, parents might reasonably claim the right to
assistance from state officials when navigating a noisy and
treacherous marketplace. Ginsberg itself emphasized that "the
308. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97.
309. See, e.g., Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432,443-46 (Tex. 1994).
310. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
311. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 104-105 (2002) ("Parents
are entitled to introduce their children to what they regard as vital sources of meaning and
value, and to hope that their children will come to share this orientation" but children
nonetheless possess "freestanding religious claims" that include "enforceable rights of exit
from the boundaries of communities defined by their parents."). See also Stephen G.
Gilles, On educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 947 (1966)
("in a liberal society, all authority is limited, and all coercion requires reasoned
justification").
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parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."312 But
even if parents do not have such a right, it seems incontestable that
the state advances a legitimate interest when it takes reasonable steps
to provide such assistance.
What then are the dangers of states enacting laws for the sole
reason of accommodating the needs of parents who do not want their
children to view materials that a free society may not suppress? That
should have been the crucial focus in Brown, even if, based on the
arguments California made both in enacting the challenged law and in
defending it in federal court, the result was ultimately correct.
In Part V, I aim to show that states should be permitted to enact
laws that restrict children's access to material that a substantial
percentage of parents prefer to have restricted. There are two
dangers when a state enacts such a law. If they can be addressed
satisfactorily, as I hope to do, then laws that require parental
permission for children to gain access to certain materials otherwise
fully protected by the First Amendment should themselves be
deemed constitutional.
V. Proposal to Regulate Children's Access to Materials
This Article proposes a statute, set forth in the Appendix, which
forbids distributing material to minors that the industry that produces
the material has labeled unsuitable for them. This addresses the
concern that states will attempt to limit material to children merely
because state officials dislike the material. It also ensures that the
prohibited material is easily known to sellers and distributers.
Laws should not be based on the Ginsberg statute because
"community standards" is too vague. The draftsman's goal should be
to address the twin concerns that the category may grow too large or
fail to be readily known to distributors subject to the restrictions. The
simple solution to meeting this set of conditions is for legislatures to
take their cue from the industries producing material which they
themselves have seen fit to categorize and label. Government
officials run the risk of becoming censors when they get into the
business of labeling material unsuitable for minors. That should not
prevent them from taking advantage of labeling that the industries
themselves are doing.
312. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
Summer 2014]1 VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 765
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Both the motion picture and video industries have created a
reviewing and labeling system that is well-known. It should be
permissible to prohibit minors from having access to materials the
industry itself labels as unsuitable to minors without parental
permission.31 This limiting condition gives the industry complete say
over which games or films the law may restrict to minors. All the
industry needs do is label the material as "suitable to minors without
parental permission" and it may not end up in the restricted grouping.
This removes from the state the power to identify unsuitable
materials-a power that many are loathe to give state officials. It also
eliminates the need to draft language that necessarily will contain
overbroad and vague terms, avoiding the problem of being unfair to
distributors or vendors who would be forced to guess whether the
particular product is within the restricted group.
As set forth in the Appendix, such a statute, as applied to video
games and, while we are at it, films, to use two prominent examples,
would simply prohibit the sale or rental of video games to someone
under seventeen years of age that have been labeled "M"
(inappropriate for persons under seventeen) and prohibit the sale or
rental of video games to someone under eighteen years of age that
have been labeled AO (unsuitable for persons under 18); it would
also prohibit selling or permitting entry to a theatre to watch a motion
picture to someone under seventeen years of age unless they are
accompanied by a parent or guardian that has been classified as "R"
(unsuitable to persons less than seventeen years of age unless they are
accompanied by a parent or guardian) and prohibit selling or
permitting entry to a theatre to someone less than eighteen years of
age to watch a motion picture that has been classified as "NC-17"
(unsuitable for persons less than eighteen years of age).3
313. But see Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (E.D. Wis. 1970);
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(Pennsylvania law that restricted minors' access to films that were "not suitable for family
or children's viewing" declared unconstitutionally vague. Although the law "purport[ed]
to adopt as its standards the ratings or standards of the Code and Rating Administration
of the Motion Picture Association of America.... The ratings employed by the
Association do not correspond to the statutory standards of 'unsuitable' or 'not suitable
for family or children's viewing."').
314. I do not propose limiting sales of video games on the Internet (such a restriction
would change my proposal from a Category D law to a Category C law). Restricting sales
to persons under eighteen cannot be applied to online sales without running the
unacceptable risk that it will unduly burden the First Amendment rights of adults. The
risk is not only that a prudent seller cannot be sure of the age of the purchaser but also
cannot be sure of the location of someone downloading a game or playing it online. As
the ACLU Amicus Brief in Brown explains, "those offering downloading or online game
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This proposed law does not collide with any claim of a child's
right to receive information over the objection of state officials' and
is fully consistent with First Amendment principles, in "keeping with
our basic American concepts of a free press operating in a free land
for a free people.""' If this proposal seems extreme to some, that
itself deserves some attention. For all the heated rhetoric in Brown
about children's rights and the need for an unregulated marketplace
relating to First Amendment protected material, American society
has long endured a system of discrimination against minors when it
comes to allowing access to such material.
Indeed, at the very point when Hollywood liberated filmmakers
to produce sexually explicit films, the film industry created the well-
known film rating system for films released by the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA"). In 1968, the MPAA devised the
idea of a voluntary rating system for three purposes. One was to
make it less likely that government would intrude by reviewing and
censoring films. The second was to inform the public (but particularly
parents) about movie content so that they could make effective
decisions concerning their children's exposure to controversial
material.317 The third, as described below, was to prevent children
from seeing in theatres films rated as unsuitable for them.
Filmmakers who belong to MPAA agree to submit their work to
the Classification and Ratings Administration ("CARA")-an
independent organization. Ratings are based both on content and
themes of a film with particular consideration to sexual content and
play must refuse service not only to all Californians, regardless of age, but everyone
throughout the world." Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697182 at
*6 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875
(1997)). Some will object that by limiting the proposal to in-store sales, the proposal will
be ineffective in providing parents with a meaningful opportunity to restrict their
children's access to adult materials. They are probably right. My proposal should be seen
as symbolic support for parents. Realistically, there is no way to prevent children from
gaining access to violent video games. Todd Gitlin considers symbolic legislation of this
sort as a "confession of despair." See MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE
CHILDREN: "INDECENCY," CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 257 (2007)
(quoting Todd Gitlin, Imagebusters: The Hollow Crusade Against TV Violence,
AMERICAN PROSPECT 46-47 (1994)). I do not agree.
315. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867-68 (1982) (plurality opinion). See also W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
316. S. Rep. No. 84-62, at 23 (1955).
317. See Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Classification and Rating Rules § 3(A) (2010),
available at http://www.filmratings.com/filmRatings-Cara/downloads/pdflratings/cara
rating-rules.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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nudity, violence, drug use, and adult language."' An important part
of the ratings arrangement is the commitment made by the National
Association of Theatre Owners, Inc. to enforce the ratings by refusing
to admit children to "R"-rated motion pictures unless accompanied
by a parent or guardian (and refusing to admit children to "NC-17"-
rated motion pictures at all).319 Retailers that sell or rent movies have
also agreed to participate in enforcement. Although films may be
released without a rating, MPAA members routinely submit all of
their films and only release them in theaters as rated.3 20 According to
the MPAA, the Federal Trade Commission tracks theater compliance
with rules regulating unaccompanied minors access to R-rated films.
According to the industry, "[i]n 2009, the FTC found that theaters
denied admission to R-rated movies to 72% of underage buyers."3 21
In other words, we already live in the world of deep regulation of
First Amendment-protected content. The film industry requires
young-looking people to prove their age before being admitted to a
restricted-rated film and refuses admittance to young people who are
unable to prove they are old enough to be admitted according to
industry rules. When young people are denied access to the theatre,
they are treated as trespassers who may be removed from the
premises by the police. Were a minor to persist in his or her claim to
be allowed to see the film, the private theatre operator would be
318. Id.
319. Minors' access to NC-17 and R-rated films is restricted at these theaters. G, PG,
and PG-13 are considered parental guidance ratings and theaters thus do not enforce any
age requirement. Id.
320. Brief for The Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Brown v.
Entm't Merchs. Ass'n 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697184 at *21
(citing Classification and Rating Administration, About Us, http://www.filmratings.com/
who.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014)). Unrated films are generally given only limited
release because about eighty-five percent of theaters participate in the MPAA system.
Richard M. Mosk, Motion Picture Ratings in the United States, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 135, 138 (1997). While 178 films were released without ratings in 2009, representing
34.2% of total film releases, they accounted for only 0.3% of gross film receipts because
they were shown on fewer screens and had lower attendance. Box Office Mojo, Yearly
Box Office, available at http://www.boxofficemojo.comlyearly/?view2=mpaa&chart=
byyear&yr=2009&view=releasedate&p=.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
321. Brief for The Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Brown v.
Entm't Merchs. Ass'n 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3697184 at *22
(citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A
FIFTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, MUSIC
RECORDING & ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (Apr.
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/marketing-
violent-entertainment-children-fifth-follow-review-industry-practices-motion-picture-
music/070412marketingviolentechildren.pdf.
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allowed to have the minor arrested and charged with criminal
trespass.
All of this is somehow treated today as an entirely private affair
without state involvement, even though the entire arrangement
depends on being allowed to enforce the rules through police
involvement. Discrimination against children on the basis of age is
broadly permissible and needs only be found rational to survive an
equal protection challenge.322
What precisely is the difference between the current regime and
one regulated by statute? The current private system (which could
not operate with the force-of-law's support) allows for indirect
censorship of children's access to First Amendment-protected
material while allowing the Supreme Court to speak in a voice that
implies such thing are forbidden in the United States. Though we
routinely use the state's police force to enforce censorship, we
comfort ourselves by insisting that the censors are from private
industry, rather than the government. This should not blind us from
the reality that we tolerate discrimination against children with regard
to constitutionally protected material.323 Moreover, the reason state
officials have not had to enact legislation to enforce the film
industry's own regulations is because the film industry does well
enough on its own.
And that, after all, is the most serious problem with the Court's
decision in Brown. Both Justices Alito and Breyer separately
complained in Brown that, by declaring that video games protected
speech which government may not regulate, the Court had removed
an implied threat over the industry3 24 that has proven to be an
important impetus for self-regulation ever since Jack Valenti left the
white House in 1966 to become the first President of the Motion
Picture Association of America.3 25 The video industry took its cue
from the film industry and currently regulates itself, although
apparently not as successfully. The Entertainment Software Rating
Board ("ESRB") is an independent entity established in the 1990s by
322. See generally City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
323. My civil liberties friends will undoubtedly be dissapointed with this proposal and
see much wrong with it. But I would remind them that no one at the ACLU ever brought
a challenge to the universal practice throughout the United States of forbidding children
from viewing films in theaters except in accordance with the industry's rules.
324. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2747-48 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 2770-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
325. Entertainment Software Rating Board, About the ESRB, available at http://www.
esrb.org/about/news/downloads/ESRB FactSheet.pdf.
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the Entertainment Software Association.326 The raters, who have no
327ties to the industry, includes as categories: Teen (suitable for ages
thirteen and older and may contain violence, suggestive themes,
crude humor, minimal blood, simulated gambling, and infrequent
strong language), Mature (suitable for ages seventeen and over and
which may contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content,
and strong language, and Adults Only (suitable only ages eighteen
and older and may include prolonged scenes of intense violence and
graphic sexual content and nudity)."
Justice Alito complained that "[t]he Court does not mention the
fact that the industry adopted this system in response to the threat of
federal regulation, a threat that the Court's opinion may now be seen
as largely eliminating."329 He also objected that the Court ignored
both that the current compliance with the industry's own rules "left
much to be desired" and "that future enforcement may decline if the
video-game industry perceives that any threat of government
regulation has vanished."330
At least as applied to video game sales, the law proposed in this
Article might actually result in more retailers willing to carry "adult
only" merchandise once the retailers could be confident that parents
who do not wish their children to purchase them are meaningfully
prevented from doing so. Today, a number of major distributors,
326. Entertainment Software Rating Board, Facts about ESRB, http://www.esrb.org/
ratings/faq.jsp#14 (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
327. Id.
328. Entertainment Software Rating Board, ESRB Ratings Guide, http://www.esrb.org
/ratings/ratings-guide.jsp#rating-categories (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). Altogether the
Ratings Guide uses six categories: EC (Early Childhood, suitable for ages three and over
and contains no material that parents would find inappropriate); E (Everyone, suitable six
and older and may contain minimal cartoon, fantasy, or mild violence and may
infrequently use mild language); E1O+ (Everyone 10+, suitable for ages ten and over and
may contain more cartoon, fantasy, or mild violence and mild language or minimal
suggestive themes); T (Teen, suitable for ages thirteen and older and may contain
violence, suggestive themes, crude humor, minimal blood, simulated gambling, and
infrequent strong language); M (Mature, suitable for ages seventeen and over and which
may contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content, and strong language); and
AO (Adults Only, suitable only ages eighteen and older and may include prolonged scenes
of intense violence and graphic sexual content and nudity).
329. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2747-48 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
330. Id. at 2748. See also id. at n.6.
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including Target and Walmart, simply do not carry "adult only"
merchandise."'
Conclusion
The result in Brown is not the problem. Its reasoning, however,
strayed far from the mark. Parents who find it ever more challenging
to raise their children in accordance with their own values deserve a
government able to help them in their efforts. Even more, they
deserve a Supreme Court sensitive to their plight. States should be
encouraged to draft carefully worded legislation designed to reduce
the risk of being declared vague or overbroad that makes it
difficultfor children to gain access to material that neither the
industry itself nor their parents considers suitable for them.
The California statute properly foundered on the shoals of
vagueness. It contained the vices of a vague law that must be
declared unconstitutional because it required decisionmakers to
decide, after the fact, decide whether a marketer violated the law.
This poorly serves public policy and risks an overbroad impact of the
statute when risk-averse distributers refuse to sell material that the
statute did not intend to cover. Nonetheless, the Court's categorical
rejection of the state exercising its power to regulate the availability
of material to minors protected by the First Amendment outside of
the field of sexually explicit material went too far.
331. See, e.g., Target, Target mature-rated games policy, TARGET.COM, http://m.target.
com/HelpContent?help=/sites/html/TargetOnline/help/productinformation/target_matur
e-rated-games-policy/target-maturerated_games-policy.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2014)
(Target only carries games with ESRB ratings, and does not carry "adults only"
merchandise); Walmart, Mature Merchandise: Music, Video Games, and Movies,
http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/8234.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2014) ("All of
[the games] that we carry are rated by the [ESRB] and we carry no adult-rated video or
computer software games.").
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Appendix
Model Statute
For purposes of this title, the following definitions shall apply:
(a) "Video game" means any electronic amusement device that
utilizes a computer, microprocessor, or similar electronic circuitry and
its own monitor, or is designed to be used with a television set or a
computer monitor, that interacts with the user of the device.
(b) "Motion picture" means any motion picture, regardless of length
or content, which is exhibited in a motion picture theater to paying
customers.
A person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled M
by the Entertainment Software Rating Board or other entity
designated by the Entertainment Software Association to someone
less than 17 years of age unless they are accompanied by a parent or
guardian;
A person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled AO
by the Entertainment Software Rating Board to someone less than 18
years of age;
A person may not sell or permit entry to a theatre to watch a motion
picture that has been classified as "R" by the Classification and
Ratings Administration of the Motion Picture Association of
America to someone less than 17 years of age unless they are
accompanied by a parent or guardian;
A person may not sell or permit entry to a theatre to watch a motion
picture that has been classified as "NC-17" by the Classification and
Ratings Administration of the Motion Picture Association of
America to someone less than 18 years of age.
(b) Proof that a defendant, or his or her employee or agent,
demanded, was shown, and reasonably relied upon evidence including
but not limited to a driver's license or government-issued
identification card that a purchaser or renter of a violent video game
was not a minor shall be an affirmative defense to any action brought.
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Any person who violates any provision of this title shall be liable in
an amount of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or a lesser amount
as determined by the court.
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